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Abstract
The ǫ-logic (which is called ǫE-logic in this paper) of Kuyper and Terwijn is a variant of first
order logic with the same syntax, in which the models are equipped with probability measures
and in which the ∀x quantifier is interpreted as “there exists a set A of measure ≥ 1 − ǫ such
that for each x ∈ A, . . . .” Previously, Kuyper and Terwijn proved that the general satisfiability
and validity problems for this logic are, i) for rational ǫ ∈ (0, 1), respectively Σ11-complete and
Π11-hard, and ii) for ǫ = 0, respectively decidable and Σ
0
1-complete. The adjective “general”
here means “uniformly over all languages.”
We extend these results in the scenario of finite models. In particular, we show that the prob-
lems of satisfiability by and validity over finite models in ǫE-logic are, i) for rational ǫ ∈ (0, 1),
respectively Σ01- and Π
0
1-complete, and ii) for ǫ = 0, respectively decidable and Π
0
1-complete. Al-
though partial results toward the countable case are also achieved, the computability of ǫE-logic
over countable models still remains largely unsolved. In addition, most of the results, of this
paper and of Kuyper and Terwijn, do not apply to individual languages with a finite number of
unary predicates. Reducing this requirement continues to be a major point of research.
On the positive side, we derive the decidability of the corresponding problems for monadic
relational languages — equality- and function-free languages with finitely many unary and zero
other predicates. This result holds for all three of the unrestricted, the countable, and the finite
model cases.
Applications in computational learning theory (CLT), weighted graphs, and artificial neural
networks (ANN) are discussed in the context of these decidability and undecidability results.
1 Introduction
In the new age of “big data,” machine learning and statistical inference have been increasingly
applied in the technology sector, and more resources than ever before are poured into advancing
our understanding of these techniques. One approach to this end is to reconcile the inductive
nature of machine learning with the deductive discipline of logic. Previous attempts include one by
computer scientist Leslie Valiant , the creator of the PAC (Probably Approximately Correct) model
of computational learning theory (CLT). In Robust Logics [26], he tried to combine the PAC model
with a fragment of first order logic (FOL) in the context of finite models. The logician H. Jerome
Keisler in [7] also investigated a variant of FOL with probabilistic quantifiers of the form (Px ≥ r)
meaning “holds for x in a set of measure at least r.”
Most recently, Terwijn and Kuyper [22] invented a probability logic with a fixed error parameter,
called ǫ-logic (or, in this paper, ǫE-logic), that is inspired by features of both Valiant and Keisler’s
work. This ǫE-logic uses the same syntax as FOL and differ only in that 1) the models are given
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probability measures, and 2) the ∀ quantifier has the interpretation of “holds for x in a set of measure
at least 1− ǫ.” In particular, the ∃ quantifier keeps the same, non-probabilistic interpretation as in
first order logic.
Such an unusual, asymmetric definition was motivated by the key property of ǫE-logic to be
learnable through examples, in a sense related to Valiant’s PAC-learning model [11, Thm. 2.3.3]:
roughly, for any desired error bound ǫ and an example oracle that emits elements of the universe
M according to a distribution D, we can learn in time polynomial in 1
ǫ
whether (M,D) |=ǫ φ
or (M,D) |=ǫ ¬φ. Thus, ǫE-logic has an inductive property, in addition to promises of deductive
properties that would seem to carry over from classical first order logic.
However, it turns out that deductive reasoning in ǫE-logic is computationally much harder than
first order logic in the general case. In fact its complexity does not even reside in the arithmetic
hierarchy, but rather the analytic one. As a result, there is no algorithm to decide (uniformly over all
first order languages) whether a given sentence is valid or satisfiable. The following table summarizes
the current knowledge on the satisfiability and validity 1 problems of ǫE-logic (defined below in (2.1.6)
and (2.1.5)). Each tuple 〈n1, n2, . . .〉 represents that the corresponding result requires the language
to have at least n1 unary predicates, at least n2 binary predicates, and so on. In particular, the
value of ω means an infinite number of the corresponding type of predicate is necessary. The empty
tuple 〈〉 means that any language suffices. Finally 〈∗〉 denotes that the set of ǫE-valid sentences
coincides with the set of valid sentences in first order logic, so any language that admits a decision
algorithm in FOL will do so in ǫE-logic as well. As general FOL validity is Σ01-complete, this means
that general ǫE-validity is also Σ01-complete.
ǫ ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q ǫ = 0
ǫE-satisfiability Σ11-complete 〈ω, 6, 2〉 [10, thm 7.6] decidable 〈〉 [10, thm 6.7]
ǫE-validity Π11-hard 〈ω, 3, 2〉 [12, thm 4.2] Σ
0
1-complete 〈∗〉 [23, prop 3.2]
Table 1: Current knowledge on general ǫE-satisfiability and ǫE-validity [10, Table 1]
It is still open, however, whether a smaller fragment of ǫE-logic — for example, languages with
a finite number of unary predicates, or languages with a single binary predicate — admits an easier
complexity.
Notice that the results are not symmetrical as in the case of first order logic, where φ is valid
iff ¬φ is not satisfiable. Indeed, ǫE-logic is paraconsistent [11, Prop. 2.2.1], because it’s possible for
(M,D) |=ǫ ∀xφ(x) and (M,D) |=ǫ ∃x¬φ(x) to hold at the same time (for example if the set of x
satisfying ¬φ has measure 0 but is not empty).
In this paper, we answer the counterpart questions for ǫE-satisfiability by and validity over finite
models and in some cases, countable models (see (2.3.5) for definitions). As noted above, we cannot
in general answer the satisfiability question by just answering the validity question, nor vice versa.
In first order logic, Trachtenbrot’s theorem [15] asserts that, perhaps counterintuitively, assessing
the validity of a theorem over only finite models is Π01-hard. Therefore we do not even have a
deductive calculus for this task.
We show that other than the case of ǫ = 0, Trachtenbrot’s theorem holds also for ǫE-logic. More
precisely, we will establish the following characterizations.
Here, the tuple notation 〈n1, n2, . . .〉 denotes language requirements, as in the last table, but 〈∗〉
means that the set of ǫE-valid sentences over finite models coincides with the corresponding set over
finite models with regard to FOL.
Like in the unrestricted case, it is still open whether the conditions on signature can be signifi-
cantly weakened.
1This notion of validity is over all probability models. It is called normal ǫE-validity in this paper. See definition
(2.1.5) and [10, remark before thm 2.6]
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ǫ ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q ǫ = 0
finite ǫE-satisfiability Σ01-complete 〈ω, 3〉 (3.4.9) decidable 〈〉 (3.1.3)
finite ǫE-validity Π01-complete 〈ω, 1〉 (3.5.9) Π
0
1-complete 〈∗〉 (3.5.9)
Table 2: Summary of results in this paper: the finite model case
Hence, other than the case of finite 0E-satisfiability, the ǫE-satisfiability and ǫE-validity problems
in the finite model scenario are as hard as the corresponding problems in ordinary first order logic
[15, p. 166]. Therefore, no general deduction mechanism exists for theorems over finite models.
In contrast, for ǫ ∈ [0, 1) rational, we show that these problems are decidable over monadic
relational languages, which are languages with only unary predicates and no function symbols or
equality. This mirrors the characterizations for the corresponding FOL fragments.
Despite these successes, the countable case remains largely unsolved. While models of ǫE-logic
have a downward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem transforming them into equivalent continuum-sized
models [13, Thm. 4.6], this theorem does not hold when “continuum-sized” is replaced with “count-
able.” So unlike FOL, the set of sentences ǫE-valid over all countable models does not coincide a
priori with the set of those over all models.
In the format of the previous tables, we summarize the current knowledge on countable ǫE-validity
and satisfiability in table (3).
ǫ ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q ǫ = 0
countable ǫE-satisfiability unknown decidable 〈〉 (3.1.3)
countable ǫE-validity Σ01-hard 〈ω, 1〉 (3.5.10) Σ
0
1-complete 〈∗〉 (3.5.4)
Table 3: Summary of results in this paper: the countable case
The outline of the paper is thus: After introducing some notations and prerequisites, we review
the basic definitions of ǫE-logic, ǫ-model, the validity and satisfiability problems, and other related
notions in section (2). We then define in section (2.2) the dual logic, ǫF-logic, in whose terms we
phrase many of our results. Briefly, in ǫF-logic, the syntax is once again identical to that of FOL,
but the quantifier ∃x is interpreted to mean “there exists a set A of measure > ǫ such that for each
x ∈ A, . . . .” Having laid out the analogue concepts over finite models, we dive straight into examples
and applications in section (2.4), hoping to motivate our main theorems and future research.
There, we employ ǫE-logic and ǫF-logic to
• model the approximation concept existence assumption of PAC learning;
• develop rudimental theories of graphs with weighted vertices and graphs with weighted edges;
and
• compute the linear threshold update rule in artificial neural networks.
With these examples in mind, we begin our deductions. In section (3.1), we prove the decidability
of 0E-satisfiability over both finite models and countable models. In section (3.2), we show that the
satisfiability and validity of sentences in any monadic relational language both reduce to linear
programming, and thus are decidable whenever ǫ ∈ Q. During the development of the reduction, we
introduce trees as semantic tools. These ideas are extended in section (3.3) to define the semantics
of q-sentences, which generalize both ǫE- and ǫF-logics by allowing all forms of quantifiers. This new
form of sentences allows us to rigorously state the inter-reduction results of Kuyper and Terwijn
between different rational ǫ parameters. Equipped aptly with powerful machinery, in section (3.4)
we tackle the Σ01-completeness of the ǫE-satisfiability problem over finite models. The hardness
3
1.1. NOTATION AND PREREQUISITES Greg Yang
proof involves a painstaking encoding of the halting set in a suitable language. The definability
proof utilizes a perturbation lemma that simplifies satisfiability to that by models with rationally-
valued distributions. Last but not least, we show in section (3.5) that 0E-validity coincides with FOL
validity when both are restricted to finite or countable models. (Of course, in the countable case, the
“countably FOL valid” sentences are just the unrestricted valid sentences by Lowenheim-Skolem).
With Kuyper’s inter-reduction theorem, we deduce that ǫE-validity for finite models is Π01-complete
and that for countable models is Σ01-hard for any strong enough language. Finally, we wrap up and
mention possible future directions of research in section (4).
1.1 Notation and Prerequisites
Sets of the form {1, 2, . . . , n} will be abbreviated JnK.
1.1.1 Logic
Script upper case lettersM and N are used to denote first order models. Their underlying universes
are written M and N . All first order languages are assumed to have an at most countable signature.
~x denotes a finite sequence of variables or parameters. |~x| denotes the length of this sequence.
φ(~x, ~y) will always represent a formula with free variables x1, . . . , xn and y1, . . . , ym, possibly with
other bound variables. In the context of a first order model M,
φ(~x, ~y; ~p) = φ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym; p1, . . . , pn),
represents a formula with free variables ~x, ~y and parameters pi ∈ M . ∀~x is the shorthand for the
quantifier block ∀x1∀x2 · · · ∀xn. Similarly, ∃~x is the shorthand for the quantifier block ∃x1∃x2 · · · ∃xn.
If φ is a (formal or informal) sentence, then ‖φ‖ ∈ {0, 1} denotes its truth value.
In formulas, we adopt the convention that ∧ is parsed before ∨ when written without parentheses.
For example,
A(x, y) ∧B(y, z) ∨R(z) ∧ x = z
is parsed as
(A(x, y) ∧B(y, z)) ∨ (R(z) ∧ x = z).
Formulas of the form
φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ · · · ∧ φk → ψ
are parsed as
(φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ · · · ∧ φk)→ ψ.
In addition, we will use square brackets [] in place of parentheses () when doing so improves the
readability.
A subset A ⊆ N is called Σ01 or Σ
0
1-definable if A is the range of a recursive function. A subset
A ⊆ N is called Σ01-hard if for every Σ
0
1 set A
′, there is a computable many-one reduction from A′
to A. A subset C ⊆ N is called Σ01-complete if C is both Σ
0
1-definable and Σ
0
1-hard.
Dually, a subset B ⊆ N is called Π01 or Π
0
1-definable (resp. Π
0
1-hard and resp. Π
0
1-complete) if its
complement N−B is Σ01 (resp. Σ
0
1-hard and resp. Σ
0
1-complete).
Please refer to Soare [21] for unexplained concepts in computability.
1.1.2 Measure Theory
Let X be a set. P(X) denotes the power set of X . By a measure µ on X , we mean a set function
µ : A → [0,∞] that is defined and countably additive on some σ-algebra A ⊆ P(X). The triple
(X,A, µ) is called a measure space. Similarly, by a finitely additive measure µ on X , we mean a set
function µ : A → [0,∞] defined on some Boolean algebra A ⊆ P(X), and µ is finitely additive on
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A. In both cases, the σ-algebra or Boolean algebra A on which µ is defined is denoted domµ. We
say that µ is everywhere defined if domµ = P(X). We say that a measure µ on X is extended by
µ′ if domµ′ ⊇ domµ. The µ-measure of a set of elements satisfying some condition φ is denoted
µ(x : φ(x)).
When we say “A has measure at least 1/2,” we implicitly assume A is first of all measurable, and
then that it has measure at least 1/2.
Primarily we will be discussing probability measures, i.e. measures µ on X with µ(X) = 1. We
use upper case script letters starting from D, E , etc to name them. In the contexts of probability
measures, we will also use the probability notation Prx∈D[φ(x)] interchangeably with D(x : φ(x)).
Please refer to Bogachev [4] for unexplained concepts in measure theory.
1.1.3 Linear Programming
A linear program is a triple L = (~x,E, f) where
• ~x is a set of |~x| = k variables,
• E is a set of |E| = n (weak) linear inequalities
ei :
k∑
j=1
cijxj ≥ d
i,
and
• f is a linear function, called the object function,
f(~x) =
x∑
j=1
qjxj .
In general, if assignment ~x = ~a satisfies all inequalities ei, then we write
C~x ≥ ~d.
Here C is the matrix {cij}i,j with row vectors
~ci = (ci1, . . . , c
i
k), and
~d = (d1, . . . , dn).
Because each equality
∑
pjxj = r can be written as two weak inequalities, we can allow E to
contain equations as well.
To maximize L is to find
max(L) := max
C~x≥~d
f(~x).
Likewise, to minimize L is to find
min(L) := min
C~x≥~d
f(~x).
L is said to be feasible if {~x : C~x ≥ ~d} is nonempty. In other words, L is feasible iff max(L) > −∞
iff min(L) <∞.
In this paper, we are mainly concerned with the feasibility problem of linear programs. As such,
we conveniently identify each program L with its set of inequalities E.
In the arithmetic model of computation, the arithmetic operations of addition, multiplication,
subtraction, division, and comparison are assumed to take unit time. It is known that maximizing,
minimizing, and finding the feasibility of a linear program is polynomial time in the arithmetic model
[17]. Because all such arithmetic operations on rational numbers are decidable,
Proposition 1.1.1. The feasibility problem of linear programs with rational coefficients is decidable.
We will also briefly cross path with strict linear programs. These are linear programsL = (~x,E, f)
where E consists of strict inequalities or equalities but with no weak inequalities.
Please refer to Schrijver [19] for unexplained concepts with regard to linear programming.
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2 Probability Logics
Here we formalize the ideas touched in the introduction. First, we revisit the definitions of ǫE-logic,
ǫE-model, and related ideas as defined by Terwijn and Kuyper. Then, we introduce ǫF-logic, the
dual logic of ǫE-logic. Finally, an abundance of examples and applications are provided to clarify
these ideas.
2.1 E-logic
Let
• L be a first order language, possibly containing equality, of a countable signature;
• ǫ ∈ [0, 1];
• M be a first-order model with universe M ;
• D be a probability measure on M defined on some σ-algebra domD ⊆ P(M).
Definition 2.1.1 (ǫE-truth). 2 Let φ(~x; ~p) = φ(x1, . . . , xn; p1, . . . , pn) represent a formula with
variables ~x and parameters pi ∈ M. We define the notion of ǫE-truth, denoted (M,D) |=ǫ φ,
inductively as follows:
1. For every atomic formula φ(~x; ~p):
(M,D) |=ǫ φ(~x; ~p) ⇐⇒ M |= φ(~x; ~p).
That is, for all tuples (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ M, φ(~a; ~p) holds.
2. We treat the logical connectives ∧ and ∨ classically. For example, for ~x, ~y, ~z distinct sequences
of variables,
(M,D) |=ǫ φ(~x, ~z; ~p) ∧ ψ(~y, ~z; ~p)
iff for all ~a ∈M |~x|,~b ∈M |~y|,~c ∈M |~z|,
(M,D) |=ǫ φ(~a,~c; ~p) ∧ ψ(~b,~c; ~p)
3. The existential quantifier is treated classically:
(M,D) |=ǫ ∃~xφ(~x, ~y; ~p)
iff there exists ~a ∈M |~x| such that
(M,D) |=ǫ φ(~a, ~y; ~p).
4. The universal quantifier is interpreted probabilistically:
(M,D) |=ǫ ∀xφ(x, ~y; ~p) ⇐⇒ Pr
a∼D
[(M,D) |=ǫ φ(a, ~y; ~p)] ≥ 1− ǫ.
Note that the universal quantifier in this definition binds a single variable x; in general it’s not
true that
(M,D) |=ǫ ∀~xφ(~x, ~y; ~p) ⇐⇒ Pr
~a∼D|~x|
[(M,D) |=ǫ φ(~a, ~y; ~p)] ≥ 1− ǫ.
5. The case of negation is split in subcases as below:
2adapted from [10]
6
Greg Yang 2.1. E-LOGIC
(a) For φ atomic, (M,D) |=ǫ ¬φ(~x; ~p) ⇐⇒ (M,D) 6|=ǫ φ(~x; ~p).
(b) ¬ distributes classically over ∧ and ∨, e.g.
(M,D) |=ǫ ¬(φ(~x, ~z; ~p) ∧ ψ(~y, ~z; ~p)) ⇐⇒ (M,D) |=ǫ ¬φ(~x, ~z; ~p) ∨ ¬ψ(~y, ~z; ~p).
(c) (M,D) |=ǫ ¬¬φ(~x; ~p) ⇐⇒ (M,D) |=ǫ φ(~x; ~p).
(d) (M,D) |=ǫ ¬∃xφ(x, ~y; ~p) ⇐⇒ (M,D) |=ǫ ∀x¬φ(x, ~y; ~p).
(e) (M,D) |=ǫ ¬∀xφ(x, ~y; ~p) ⇐⇒ (M,D) |=ǫ ∃x¬φ(x, ~y; ~p).
6. The implication symbol → reduces to boolean combinations classically:
(M,D) |=ǫ φ(~x, ~z; ~p)→ ψ(~y, ~z; ~p) ⇐⇒ (M,D) |=ǫ ¬φ(~x, ~z; ~p) ∨ ψ(~y, ~z; ~p).
7. The equivalence symbol ↔ reduces to the conjunction of two implications:
(M,D) |=ǫ φ(~x, ~z; ~p)↔ ψ(~y, ~z; ~p)
iff
(M,D) |=ǫ [φ(~x, ~z; ~p)→ ψ(~y, ~z; ~p)] ∧ [ψ(~x, ~z; ~p)→ φ(~y, ~z; ~p)]
This logic system is called ǫE-logic. When referring to the set of all such logics for ǫ ∈ [0, 1] or
when ǫ is a fixed parameter implicit in the context, we simply use the term E-logic.
To make sure that the ∀ quantifier makes sense, we need to impose measurability conditions on
definable sets. In this paper, classical models refer to the models used in ordinary first-order logic.
They are distinct from the concept defined here:
Definition 2.1.2. Let L be a first order language of a countable signature, possibly containing
equality, and let ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. Then an ǫE-model for the language L consists of a classical first-order
L-model M together with a probability measure D over M such that:
1. For all formulas φ = φ(x1, . . . , xn) and all a1, . . . , an−1 ∈ M, the set
{an ∈ M : (M,D) |=ǫ φ(a1, . . . , an)}
is D-measurable.
2. All relations of arity n are Dn-measurable (including equality, if it is in L), and all functions
of arity n are measurable as functions from (Mn,Dn) to (M,D). In particular, constants are
D-measurable.
A probability model is a pair (M,D) that is an ǫE-model for every ǫ ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 2.1.3. Two ǫE-models (M,D) and (N , E) are ǫ-elementarily equivalent, denoted by
(M,D) ≡ǫ (N , E),
iff for every formula φ,
(M,D) |=ǫ φ ⇐⇒ (N , E) |=ǫ φ.
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Definition 2.1.4. Two formulas φ and ψ are ǫ-equivalent, denoted by
φ ≡ǫ ψ
iff for every ǫE-model (M,D),
(M,D) |=ǫ φ ⇐⇒ (M,D) |=ǫ ψ.
φ and ψ are called (semantically) equivalent, written
φ ≡ ψ,
if φ ≡ǫ ψ for all ǫ ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 2.1.5. Let φ be a first order sentence. We say that φ is ǫE-valid if for all ǫE-models
(M,D), (M,D) |=ǫ φ. φ is normally ǫE-valid iff for all probability models (M,D), (M,D) |=ǫ φ.
Similarly we define
Definition 2.1.6. A sentence φ is said to be ǫE-satisfiable if there exists an ǫE-model (M,D)
such that (M,D) |=ǫ φ.
To distinguish between these concepts and the analogue concepts over finite and countable ǫE-
models, we also prefix these terms with unrestricted or postfix them with in the unrestricted case. For
example, ǫE-valid means the same thing as unrestricted ǫE-valid, or as ǫE-valid in the unrestricted
case.
Likewise, to make the distinction clear from the corresponding notions in FOL, we say
Definition 2.1.7. A formula φ is classically valid if every first order model satisfies φ.
A formula φ is classically satisfiable if some first order model satisfies φ.
We could define normally ǫE-satisfiability in analogy to normally ǫE-validity, but this concept
would be equivalent to ǫE-satisfiability [10, Thm 2.6, Prop. 2.7].
Finally, we record the following proposition which will often be implicitly applied.
Proposition 2.1.8 (Terwijn [22]). Every formula φ is semantically equivalent to a formula φ′ in
prenex normal form.
2.2 The Dual Logic, F-logic
Definition 2.2.1. Let L be a countable first order language, possibly containing equality. Let
Φ = Φ(x1, . . . , xn) be a first order formula in the language L, and let ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. If (M,D) is an
ǫE-model, then we define ǫF-truth, written (M,D) ⊢ǫ Φ, by
(M,D) ⊢ǫ Φ ⇐⇒ (M,D) 6|=ǫ ¬Φ.
We call the logic under ⊢ǫ ǫF-logic.
Suppose for quantifiers ▽1,▽2, . . . ,▽n ∈ {∀, ∃} and a quantifier free formula ψ,
Φ(~y; ~p) := ▽1x1▽2x2 · · ·▽nxnψ(x1, x2, . . . , xn, ~y; ~p).
Then if ▽′i denotes the dual quantifier of ▽i (interchange ∃ with ∀),
¬Φ(~y; ~p) ≡ǫ ▽
′
1x1▽
′
2x2 · · ·▽
′
nxn¬ψ(x1, x2, . . . , xn, ~y; ~p).
For example, if ▽i is ∀ for odd i and ∃ for even i, and n is odd, then (M,D) 6|=ǫ ¬Φ iff
8
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for all x1,
there exists a set of x2 with measure strictly greater than ǫ such that,
for all x3,
...
for all xn,
ψ(x1, x2, . . . , xn) holds.
With this remark, it’s easy to see that ǫF-logic is the dual logic of ǫE-logic, in that the quantifier
∀ is interpreted classically, while the quantifier ∃ is interpreted as “with measure strictly greater
than ǫ.”
More formally and in parallel with the inductive definition given for E-logic, we can write
1. For every atomic formula φ(~x; ~p):
(M,D) ⊢ǫ φ(~x; ~p) ⇐⇒ M |= φ(~x; ~p).
That is, for all tuples (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ M, φ(~a; ~p) holds.
2. We treat the logical connectives ∧ and ∨ classically. For example, for ~x, ~y, ~z distinct sequences
of variables,
(M,D) ⊢ǫ φ(~x, ~z; ~p) ∧ ψ(~y, ~z; ~p)
iff for all ~a ∈M |~x|,~b ∈M |~y|,~c ∈M |~z|,
(M,D) ⊢ǫ φ(~a,~c; ~p) ∧ ψ(~b,~c; ~p)
3. The universal quantifier is treated classically:
(M,D) ⊢ǫ ∀~xφ(~x, ~y; ~p)
iff for all ~a ∈M |~x|
(M,D) ⊢ǫ φ(~a, ~y; ~p).
4. The existential quantifier is interpreted probabilistically:
(M,D) ⊢ǫ ∃xφ(x, ~y; ~p) ⇐⇒ Pr
a∼D
[(M,D) ⊢ǫ φ(a, ~y; ~p)] > ǫ.
Note that the existential quantifier in this definition binds a single variable x; in general it’s
not true that
(M,D) ⊢ǫ ∃~xφ(~x, ~y; ~p) ⇐⇒ Pr
~a∼D|~x|
[(M,D) ⊢ǫ φ(~a, ~y; ~p)] > ǫ.
5. The case of negation is split in subcases as below:
(a) For φ atomic, (M,D) ⊢ǫ ¬φ(~x; ~p) ⇐⇒ (M,D) 6⊢ǫ φ(~x; ~p).
(b) ¬ distributes classically over ∧ and ∨, e.g.
(M,D) ⊢ǫ ¬(φ(~x, ~z; ~p) ∧ ψ(~y, ~z; ~p)) ⇐⇒ (M,D) ⊢ǫ ¬φ(~x, ~z; ~p) ∨ ¬ψ(~y, ~z; ~p).
(c) (M,D) ⊢ǫ ¬¬φ(~x; ~p) ⇐⇒ (M,D) ⊢ǫ φ(~x; ~p).
(d) (M,D) ⊢ǫ ¬∃xφ(x, ~y; ~p) ⇐⇒ (M,D) ⊢ǫ ∀x¬φ(x, ~y; ~p).
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(e) (M,D) ⊢ǫ ¬∀xφ(x, ~y; ~p) ⇐⇒ (M,D) ⊢ǫ ∃x¬φ(x, ~y; ~p).
6. The implication symbol → reduces to boolean combinations classically:
(M,D) ⊢ǫ φ(~x, ~z; ~p)→ ψ(~y, ~z; ~p) ⇐⇒ (M,D) ⊢ǫ ¬φ(~x, ~z; ~p) ∨ ψ(~y, ~z; ~p).
7. The equivalence symbol ↔ reduces to the conjunction of two implications:
(M,D) ⊢ǫ φ(~x, ~z; ~p)↔ ψ(~y, ~z; ~p)
iff
(M,D) ⊢ǫ [φ(~x, ~z; ~p)→ ψ(~y, ~z; ~p)] ∧ [ψ(~x, ~z; ~p)→ φ(~y, ~z; ~p)]
We can similarly define ǫF-models for F-logic by replacing condition 1 of definition (2.1.2) with
• For all formulas φ = φ(x1, . . . , xn) and all a1, . . . , an−1 ∈ M, the set
{an ∈M : (M,D) ⊢ǫ φ(a1, . . . , an)}
is D-measurable.
However, note that
{an ∈ M : (M,D) ⊢ǫ φ(a1, . . . , an)} =M − {an ∈ M : (M,D) |=ǫ ¬φ(a1, . . . , an)}
and thus, (M,D) is an ǫE-model iff it’s also an ǫF-model. Henceforward we will uniformly adopt
the term ǫ-model for this use case.
Similarly, it should be clear from definitions (2.1.3) and (2.1.4) that (M,D) ≡ǫ (N , E) iff
(M,D) ⊢ǫ φ ⇐⇒ (N , E) ⊢ǫ φ,
and φ ≡ǫ ψ iff for every ǫ-model (M,D),
(M,D) ⊢ǫ φ ⇐⇒ (M,D) ⊢ǫ ψ.
ǫF-validity and ǫF-satisfiability (along with their synonyms) are defined similar to definitions
(2.1.5) and (2.1.6). Due to duality, we have that
Proposition 2.2.2. φ is ǫF-valid iff ¬φ is ǫE-satisfiable. In general, φ is ǫX-© iff ¬φ is not ǫY-©′,
where (X, Y) is a permutation of {E, F}, and (©,©′) is a permutation of {valid, satisfiable}.
Table (4) states the dual version of table (1).
ǫ ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q ǫ = 0
ǫF-validity Π11-complete 〈ω, 6, 2〉 [10, thm 7.6] decidable 〈〉 [10, thm 6.7]
ǫF-satisfiability Σ11-hard 〈ω, 3, 2〉 [12, thm 4.2] Π
0
1-complete 〈∗〉 [23, prop 3.2]
Table 4: Summary of current knowledge on general ǫF-satisfiability and ǫF-validity
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2.3 Finite and Countable Concepts
Definition 2.3.1. An ǫ-model (M,D) is finite iff |M| is finite. Similarly, an ǫ-model (M,D) is
countable iff |M| ≤ ℵ0.
Kuyper and Terwijin ahve shown well-formed model-theoretic properties exist for E-logic (and
by duality, F-logic). For example, a downward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem always allows one to
work on a model of continuum size [13, Thm. 4.6], and a variant of ultrapower construction works
for a weakened definition of ǫ-models [13, Sec. 8]. But they are futile in the finite setting for the
same reason that their classical counterparts do not work in classical finite model theory.
Despite this difficulty, finite and countable ǫ-models are still very conducive to analysis because
from them we automatically get (finite and countable) probability models.
Lemma 2.3.2. Let (M,D) be an ǫ-model. If D′ extends D, then (M,D′) ≡ǫ (M,D).
Proof. By induction on formula complexity, we show (M,D′) |=ǫ φ ⇐⇒ (M,D) |=ǫ φ. All cases
other than ∀ are trivial, as they don’t involve measures.
For φ(~x; ~p) = ∀yψ(y, ~x; ~p), we have
(M,D) |=ǫ φ(~x; ~p)
⇐⇒ D(a ∈M : (M,D) |=ǫ ψ(a, ~x; ~p)) ≥ 1− ǫ
⇐⇒ D′(a ∈ M : (M,D) |=ǫ ψ(a, ~x; ~p)) ≥ 1− ǫ
⇐⇒ (M,D′) |=ǫ φ(~x; ~p)
where the middle equivalence derives from the fact that D′ agrees with D on domD.
Lemma 2.3.3 (Tarski [3]). Every finitely additive measure D on a set X can be extended to a
finitely additive measure D′ so that domD′ = P(X).
The above two lemmas allow us to “complete” ǫ-models in the following sense:
Proposition 2.3.4. Let (M,D) be any finite or countable ǫ-model. D can be extended to a measure
D′ with domD′ = P(M). Therefore, (M,D′) is a probability model and by (2.3.2),
(M,D) ≡ǫ (M,D
′).
Proof. The case of finite ǫ-models (M,D) follows directly from the lemma since D is countably
additive iff D is finitely additive.
For the case of countable models (M,D), notice that D cannot be atomless, or else M would
have to be uncountable. Suppose a0 ⊆ M is an atom. If M − a0 is not null, then the restriction of
D on M − a0 by the same reasoning must not be atomless, and so there is an atom a1 ⊆ M − a0.
By induction, M can be expressed as the disjoint union of at most countable number of atoms and
a null set. Hence it suffices to show that (by assuming M is an atom itself) D extends to P(M)
when D is a 0-1 measure.
Suppose not. Then every measure defined on all of P(M) is inconsistent with D. In particular,
the measure Ix concentrating measure 1 on an element x ∈M cannot be a extension of D, and that
can happen only if there is Tx ∈ D with measure 0 but contains x. Thus there is a countable set
{Tx : x ∈ M} satisfying D(Tx) = 0 and Tx ∋ x. But by countable subadditivity 0 =
∑
xD(Tx) ≥
D(M) = 1, which is a contradiction.
Because every finite or countable ǫ-model (M,D) can be taken to have D everywhere defined on
P(M), we treat D as a point function on M . It then makes sense to speak of D(a) for a ∈ M and
in particular, elements of measure zero, or null elements.
Finally, we define the main objects of study in this paper.
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Definition 2.3.5. For X = F or E:
A sentence φ is said to be finitely ǫX-valid and is called a finite ǫX-validity (resp. countably
ǫX-valid and countable ǫX-validity) if φ is ǫX-satisfied by all finite (resp. countable) ǫ-models.
Likewise, a sentence φ is said to be finitely ǫX-satisfiable and is called a finite ǫX-satisfiable
(resp. countably ǫX-satisfiable and countable ǫX-satisfiable) if φ is ǫX-satisfied by some finite
(resp. countable) ǫ-models.
In addition, to distinguish between these concepts and the similar concepts in FOL, we say that
a formula φ is finitely classically valid if φ is satisfied by all finite first order models; a formula φ is
finitely classically satisfiable if φ is satisfied by some finite first order model.
Note that by the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, what would be the concept of “countably classically
valid” coincides with unrestricted validity in first order logic. This is not true for ǫE- or ǫF-logic
unconditionally. Terwijn and Kuyper provide a counterexample in [13, exmp 4.5].
2.4 Examples and Applications
Here the goal is two-fold: 1) we clarify concepts developed in the previous sections through examples,
and 2) we also note possible applications of ǫE- and ǫF-logic, in part to motivate the main theorems.
For the second point, we feel it is illuminating to mention results in later sections. Readers are
encouraged to check that these anachronism are correctly applied after perusing their respective
expositions.
We first exhibit some examples that highlight the difference in semantics between classical first
order logic and our ǫE- and ǫF-logics.
Example 2.4.1. Let φ := ∃x∀y[x = y] where = is true equality. Classically, a model M |= φ iff M is
a singleton. This also holds in ǫF-logic for all ǫ < 1. In ǫE-logic, (M,D) |=ǫ φ iff there is a singleton
subset {a} ⊆M such that D({a}) ≥ 1− ǫ.
Example 2.4.2. Let φ := ∀x∃y[x = y] where = is true equality. Classically, φ holds in every nonempty
model. This is true also for ǫE-logic. But (M,D) ⊢ǫ φ iff every element ofM has D-measure greater
than ǫ. In particular, when ǫ = 1
n
, M must have less than n elements; when ǫ = 0, M is at most
countable.
Example 2.4.3. Let φ := ∃x∀y[x 6= y] where = is true equality. φ is a contradiction in classical first
order logic and in ǫF-logic, but (M,D) |=ǫ φ iff there is a singleton subset {a} ⊆M with D-measure
less than ǫ.
Example 2.4.4. Let φ := ∀x∃y[x 6= y] where = is true equality. Classically and in ǫE-logic, M |= φ
iff |M | ≥ 2. In ǫF-logic, (M,D) ⊢ǫ φ iff every singleton subset of M has D-measure at most 1− ǫ.
Example 2.4.5. Let ψ(x) be a formula with a single free variable. In first order logic,
ψ(x), ∀y[x = y → ψ(y)], ∃y[x = y ∧ ψ(y)]
are equivalent formulas.
In ǫE-logic, for any parameter a ∈M ,
(M,D) |=ǫ ψ(a) ⇐⇒ (M,D) |=ǫ ∃y[y = a ∧ ψ(y)]
but (M,D) |=ǫ ∀y[y = a→ ψ(y)] whenever {b : b 6= a} ⊆M has inner D-measure at least 1− ǫ.
Likewise, in ǫF-logic, for any parameter a ∈M ,
(M,D) ⊢ǫ ψ(a) ⇐⇒ (M,D) ⊢ǫ ∀y[y = a→ ψ(y)]
but (M,D) 6⊢ǫ ∃y[y = a ∧ ψ(y)] whenever {a} ⊆M has D-measure ≤ ǫ.
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In first order logic, a common way to assess whether a theorem ψ follows from a set of axioms T
is to pass the sentence τ := ¬(T → ψ) to some resolution algorithm R. T implies ψ iff R resolves τ
to a contradiction.
But the obvious analogue for ǫE-logic cannot work: (M,D) |=ǫ φ→ ψ is not equivalent to
(M,D) |=ǫ φ =⇒ (M,D) |=ǫ ψ
because of the paraconsistency of ǫE-logic. However, from definition (2.1.1), (M,D) |=ǫ φ→ ψ iff
(M,D) |=ǫ ¬φ ∨ ψ
which is equivalent to
(M,D) 6|=ǫ ¬φ =⇒ (M,D) |=ǫ ψ.
Rephrasing using ǫF-logic then,
Proposition 2.4.6 (deduction theorem). (M,D) |=ǫ φ→ ψ iff
(M,D) ⊢ǫ φ =⇒ (M,D) |=ǫ ψ.
By duality, (M,D) ⊢ǫ φ→ ψ iff
(M,D) |=ǫ φ =⇒ (M,D) ⊢ǫ ψ.
Thus, axioms T , interpreted inside ǫF-logic, (metalogically) imply theorem ψ, interpreted inside
ǫE-logic, iff
T → ψ
is an ǫE-validity.
By results (3.4.2) and (3.5.6) of Kuyper and Terwijn that we record in later sections, we can
even interpret each quantifier in T (resp. in ψ) in αF-logics (resp. αE-logics) for different αs, in this
sense:
Let T be in prenex normal form ▽1x1 · · ·▽nxnφ(~x). For every ▽i = ∃, we
translate ▽ixi as “there exists a set Ai with measure > αi such that for each
xi ∈ Ai, . . . ;” The quantifier ∀ is interpreted as usual. Each αi can be any
arbitrary rational number in [0, 1], independent of what other αjs are.
Similarly, let ψ be in prenex normal form ▽1x1 · · ·▽mxmφ′(~x). For every ▽i = ∀,
we translate ▽ixi as “there exists a set Bi with measure ≥ 1− βi such that for
each xi ∈ Bi, . . . .” The quantifier ∃ is interpreted as usual. Each βi can be any
arbitrary rational number in [0, 1], independent of what other βjs are.
The implication T =⇒ ψ (resp. ψ =⇒ T ) under these translations can be
expressed as some sentence in ǫE-logic (resp. ǫF-logic).
(∇)
As a corollary, if T is a conjunction of sentences {Λj}lj=1 and ψ is a disjunction of sentences
{Γi}ki=1, then for any finite {αj}
l
j=1, {βi}
k
i=1 of rational numbers in [0, 1], there is some sentence Φ
such that the following are equivalent:
• for all finite (M,D), if (M,D) simultaneously αjF-satisfies each Λj, then
(M,D) |=βi Γi for some i ∈ JkK.
• Φ is finitely ǫE-valid.
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Though such a form of deduction theorem may not seem useful at first, it nevertheless allows the
expression of statements regarding many types of mathematical objects, including concept classes
in CLT, graphs with weighted vertices, graphs with weighted edges, and artificial neural networks.
In what follows, we give examples of such expressions and their meanings in both ǫE-logic and
ǫF-logic. For ease of reading, we will write ∀
≥1−ǫ
for ∀ in the context of ǫE-logic and ∃
>ǫ
for ∃ in the
context of ǫF-logic. As noted, in a single sentence, the ǫ parameter may vary, so it is meaningful to
write ∃
>0
x ∃
>1/2
y ∃
>ǫ
z. Each boolean symbol whose meaning has not been defined is a shorthand for the
usual composition of symbols ¬,∧,∨.
These examples will hopefully give a rough picture of the implications of our decidability and
undecidability results.
Example 2.4.7 (PAC learning). Define the following:
• an example space is a probability space (X,D) with probability distribution D;
• a concept class C is a collection {U ⊆ X} of subsets of X , identified with their indicator
functions;
• for U ∈ C, an example oracle EX(X,D, U) is a device that randomly returns a pair (x ∈
X,U(x)) for every invocation. The pair is sampled according to D.
In the basic PAC learning model [25], we are given X , C, and an example oracle EX that emits
elements of X according to an unknown distribution D and unknown concept U ∈ C. We wish to
efficiently find a concept close enough to U , in the following sense:
We have a probabilistic algorithm that, for all error parameters ǫ and δ, for all distribu-
tions D on X , in time polynomial in 1
ǫ
and 1
δ
, returns U ′ ∈ C with
Pr
x∼D
[U ′(x) 6= U(x)] < ǫ
more than 1− δ of the time. Such a U ′ is called an approximation concept.
Typically, X is taken to be Bs = {0, 1}s for some s, and C is a subclass of the boolean functions
on Bn.
It is important to note that this learning model assumes
for the given EX, some approximation concept U ′ exists in C. (℘)
In particular, this happens if EX labels elements according to some concept in C. But in practice
this may not always be the case 3. In ǫE-logic with a language having monadic predicate P1, . . . , Ps
and c, we can express this assumption.
In what follows, for a general vector w, wi will represent the ith value of w; M is a first order
model over universe Bs, and
PMi (v) = vi, c
M(v) = the label generated by EX;
D is a probability measure everywhere defined over M .
1. (Point class). The point concept class over Bs is the collection
{{v} : v ∈ Bs}.
3hence the research into agnostic learning ; see [5] for an overview
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In other words, each concept labels exactly one point of Bs as 1 and the rest as 0. Assumption
(℘) holds for the point class iff
(M,D) |=ǫ ∃x ∀
≥1−ǫ
y[c(y)↔
s∧
i=1
(Pi(x)↔ Pi(y))].
(Of course it is much more convenient to use equality, but we refrain in order to take advantage
of the decidability of monadic relational languages)
2. (Parity class). For each v ∈ Bs, let
Ov(x) := v · w mod 2
where (−) · (−) mod 2 is the dot product in the vector space (Z2)
s.
The parity concept class over Bs is the collection
{Ov : v ∈ Bs}.
Then assumption (℘) holds for the parity class iff
(M,D) |=ǫ ∃x ∀
≥1−ǫ
y[c(y)↔
s⊕
i=1
(Pi(x) ∧ Pi(y))].
3. (Conjunction class). The conjunction concept Cw represented by a vector w ∈ {−1, 0, 1}s
labels v ∈ Bs as 1 iff for each i ∈ JsK such that wi 6= 0, vi = (wi + 1)/2. The conjunction
concept class is the collection of Cw over all w ∈ {−1, 0, 1}s.
Assumption (℘) holds for the conjunction class iff
(M,D) |=ǫ ∃x∃y ∀
≥1−ǫ
z
(
c(z)↔
s∧
i=1
[(Pi(x) ∧ Pi(y)→ Pi(z)) ∧ (¬Pi(x) ∧ ¬Pi(z)→ ¬Pi(z))]
)
Here we code each conjunction concept Cw using 2 bitstrings x and y: if xi = yi = 1, wi = 1;
if xi = yi = 0, wi = −1; otherwise wi = 0.
4. (1-Decision lists). Let Z be a triple (α, β, b) where α, β ∈ Bs and b ∈ {0, 1}. A 1-decision list
DLZ represented by Z is the decision procedure that, on input v ∈ Bs, runs as follows
if v1 = α1 then output β1
else if v2 = α2 then output β2
...
else if vs = αs then output βs
else output b
end if.
Let
ψi(x, y, w) := [P1(x)⊕ P1(w)] ∧ [P2(x)⊕ P2(w)] ∧ · · ·
∧ [Pi−1(x)⊕ Pi−1(w)] ∧ [Pi(x)↔ Pi(w)]
→ [c(w)↔ Pi(y)].
ψi represents a computation of DL(x,y,b) (for any b) on input w that proceeds to the ith if
statement before returning.
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Let
φ(x, y, z, w) := [P1(x) ⊕ P1(w)] ∧ [P2(x)⊕ P2(w)] ∧ · · ·
∧ [Ps−1(x) ⊕ Ps−1(w)] ∧ [Ps(x)⊕ Ps(w)]
→ [c(w)↔ P1(z)]
φ represents a computation of DL(x,y,z1) on input w that proceeds to the else statement.
Then assumption (℘) holds for the 1-decision lists iff
(M,D) |=ǫ ∃x∃y∃z ∀
≥1−ǫ
w
(
φ(x, y, z, w) ∧
s∧
i=1
ψi(x, y, w)
)
.
VC dimension is an important quantity of concept classes studied in CLT. We will not define it
here (consult [6]) but wish to mention to the computational learning theorists that, as these examples
illustrate, when a concept class C over Bs has VC dimension f(s), assumption (℘) can be expressed
over (M,D) by a formula with O(f(s)) number of quantifiers (exercise!).
On the other hand, in ǫF-logic, we can express certain interesting conditions on the probability
space (M,D).
1. “more than half the time, the label is 1”:
(M,D) ⊢ 1
2
∃
>1/2
xc(x).
2. “the probability that the ith bit is 1 is strictly between ǫ and 1− ǫ”:
uniform
i
| 12−ǫ| := (M,D) ⊢ǫ ∀x ∃>ǫy[Pi(x) ⊕ Pi(y)].
As a straightforward generalization, the quantifier-free part of the expression can be swapped
out for a more complicated boolean combination.
3. “most bits are irrelevant to the concept — the label only depends on 2 fixed bits”:
atteff2 := (M,D) ⊢ǫ
∨
i<j
∀x∀y[(Pi(x)↔ Pi(y)) ∧ (Pj(x)↔ Pj(y))→ (c(x)↔ c(y))].
This is the setting for attribute efficient learning [9].
As noted before, each ǫ in these examples can vary over the rationals at will. Imagine we want to
find if uniformiδ1 and uniform
j
δ2
along with atteff2 would imply (℘) for some concept class C.
We may do so by querying for the ǫE-validity of a two-part sentence
T → φ
derived from applying note (∇).
By the decidability of monadic relational languages (3.2.8 and 3.2.11) established later, these
kinds of questions are all decidable, as long as all statements use only unary predicates.
It is also possible to add a BIT relation to ǫE- and ǫF-logics along the lines of the corresponding
relation in classical finite model theory [15]. One can then express concept classes over all size
parameter s with one single sentence. However, the complexity of deduction then becomes unknown.
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Example 2.4.8 (graphs with weighted vertices). Let L be a language with a single binary relation
E(·, ·), standing for the edge relation between two vertices. As in first order logic, any ǫ-model of
this language is automatically a directed graph with at most one edge between every pair of vertices
(including loops). Moreover, in such ǫ-models, to each vertex of the graph structure is assigned
a weight in [0, 1] such that the total sum of all vertex weights is 1; however, the edges are not
weighted. Such graphs with weighted vertices can be used to model, among many things, cities with
populations and in general the PageRank algorithm.
Because in ǫF-logic, ∀ is interpreted classically, we can express quite a few properties of graphs:
1. loopless:
∀x¬E(x, x).
2. undirected:
∀x∀y[E(x, y)↔ E(y, x)].
3. complete:
∀x∀y[E(x, y) ∧ E(y, x)].
4. bipartite with a fixed partition (if L has a unary predicate A):
∀x∀y[(A(x)↔ A(y))→ ¬E(x, y) ∧ ¬E(y, x)].
Similarly, k-coloring can be expressed as well.
5. in a simple graph, “every 1-neighborhood collectively has weight more than ǫ” (if L has equal-
ity):
∀x ∃
>ǫ
y[y = x ∨ E(x, y)].
6. “every directed triangle has collective measure more than ǫ” (if L has equality):
∀x∀y∀z[E(x, y) ∧ E(y, z) ∧E(z, x)→ ∃
>ǫ
w(w = x ∨w = y ∨ w = z)].
7. “every element has a unique successor of positive measure” (when L has equality):
∀x ∃
>0
y[E(x, y) ∧ ∀z(E(x, z)→ z = y)].
8. “there exists a set of ‘initial’ vertices A collectively with weight more than ǫ such that every
v ∈ A is connected to every vertex in the entire graph”:
∃
>ǫ
x∀yE(x, y).
On the other hand, in ǫE-logic, we can express the likes of the following.
1. “there is a clique of size k”:
∃~x

 ∧
1≤i<j≤k
E(xi, xj) ∧ E(xj , xi)

 .
In general, for any fixed graph G, we can express the existence of a subgraph isomorphic to G.
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2. “there is a subgraph isomorphic to G that carries weight ≥ 1− ǫ”:
∃~x
[
isoG(~x) ∧ ∀
≥1−ǫ
y
k∨
i=1
y = xi
]
,
where isoG is a formula expressing ~x is isomorphic to G.
3. in a simple graph, “there is a single vertex v that is connected to at least 1− ǫ (by weight) of
other vertices”:
∃v ∀
≥1−ǫ
xE(x, v).
In ǫE-logic, we can also make weakened version of universal statements from the ǫF-examples by
replacing ∀ with ∀
≥1−0
= ∀
≥1
. The transformed sentences will then quantify over all elements of positive
measure, rather than all elements. For instance, the sentences given for the loopless, undirected,
complete, and bipartite properties all carry over to apply to the subgraph consisting of all nonnull
vertices.
This weakened quantifier suffices in most cases. In fact, later on, our proof of the undecidability
of finite ǫE-satisfiability (3.4.4) depends heavily on this competency of ∀
≥1
.
In some cases, when ǫ > 0, the quantifier ∃
>ǫ
can also be replaced (per note (∇)) with ∀
≥ǫ
without
affecting the intended semantics very much. For instance, the property “every 1-neighborhood
collectively has weight more than ǫ” differs very little from “every 1-neighborhood collectively has
weight at least ǫ” in most imaginable applications.
Example 2.4.9 (graphs with weighted edges). Instead of assigning a measure to vertices, often we
want to assign numbers to edges of a graph, for example in a MAX-FLOW or a path-finding problem.
Let L be a language with binary relations I(·, ·), C(·, ·), and D(·, ·). Here I(x, y) represents that
the codomain of edge x equals the domain of edge y; D(x, y) (resp. C(x, y)) represent that edges x
and y have the same domain (resp. codomain). Thus, any graph with weighted edges {ei}i∈M such
that the total weight equals 1 is automatically a probability model in L.
Conversely, suppose (M,D) has an everywhere defined measure D and classically satisfies the
axioms of
• “C and D are equivalence relations”:
∀xC(x, x)
∀x∀yC(x, y)↔ C(y, x)
∀x∀y∀zC(x, y) ∧C(y, z)→ C(z, x)
(EQR)
along with the analogues for D.
• “incidence relation respects domain and codomain”:
∀x∀y(C(x, y)→ ∀z[I(x, z)↔ I(y, z)])
∀x∀y(D(x, y)→ ∀z[I(z, x)↔ I(z, y)]).
(IDC)
• “domain and codomain respect incidence relation”:
∀x∀y(I(x, y)→ ∀z[C(z, x)↔ I(z, y)])
∀x∀y(I(x, y)→ ∀z′[D(z′, y)↔ I(x, z′)])
(DCI)
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• “domain and codomain are unique”:
∀x∀y∀z[I(x, y) ∧ I(x, z)→ D(y, z)]
∀x∀y∀z[I(y, x) ∧ I(z, x)→ C(y, z)]
(!DC)
Let VD and VC be respectively the equivalence classes modulo D
M and CM. For every element
a, denote its equivalence class in VD by JaKD and that in VC by JaKC . By axiom (DCI), JaKD ∈ VD
can be identified with JbKC ∈ VC , JaKD ∼ JbKC , if IM(b, a). Thus we can form the vertex set
V = (VD ∪ VC)/ ∼. Axiom (IDC) implies that the relation IM induces a relation IMC on VC ×M .
By factoring through the identification ∼, the relation IMC can be treated as a relation on V ×M
with the property that, for every element a of M , IMC (JaKD , a). But axiom (!DC) says that this I
M
C
is in fact a function M → V . We therefore retrieve the domain function dom : M → V, a 7→ JaKD.
By the same reasoning, we also derive the codomain function cod : M → V, a 7→ JaKC . These data
then uniquely determine a graph with edges M and vertices V .
As ǫF-logic interprets ∀ classically, it can convey the axioms along with many of the usual
properties of graphs.
1. loopless:
∀x¬I(x, x).
2. “no more than one edge per pair of vertices” (if L has equality):
∀x∀y[D(x, y) ∧C(x, y)→ x = y].
3. bidirectional: “each edge x has a corresponding edge with positive weight that goes in the
opposite direction”:
∀x ∃
>0
y[I(x, z) ∧ I(z, x)].
On the other hand, we cannot express undirectedness without changing the axioms. The
reader is encouraged to work out the axioms for a simple graph with weighted edges.
4. complete: “for any two edges x and y, there is an edge with positive weight that connects x
to y”:
∀x∀y ∃
>0
z[I(x, z) ∧ I(z, y)].
5. “every directed triangle has collective weight > ǫ” (if L has equality):
∀x∀y∀z[I(x, y) ∧ I(y, z) ∧ I(z, x)→ ∃
>ǫ
w(w = x ∨ w = y ∨ w = z)].
For any fixed k, we can also make the analogous statement for k-cycles.
6. “every length k path from x to y has weight > ǫ” (if L has equality):
pathmin
k
ǫ (x, y) := ∀~x
(
k−1∧
i=1
I(xi, xi+1)→ ∃
>ǫ
y
(
k∨
i=1
y = xi
))
.
For any fixed graph G of size k, the constructions in this and the last items generalize to make
statements of the form “any subgraph isomorphic to G has total weight > ǫ.”
As with example (2.4.9), in ǫE-logic, for any fixed graph G, we can express the existence of a
subgraph isomorphic to G. We can also assert that some such subgraph has weight ≥ 1− ǫ. These
properties may be desirable when working with MAX-FLOW problems.
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Finally, we can also transform statements in ǫF-logic into weaker statements in ǫE-logic by
replacing ∀ with ∀
≥1
and ∃
>ǫ
with ∀
≥ǫ
. With emphasis, we note that all axioms (EQR), (DCI), (IDC),
and (!DC) of graphs with weighted edges are universal sentences. Therefore, as long as the presence
of zero-weight edges present no difficulty, we can also investigate implications
T =⇒ ψ
with ψ interpreted in ǫF-logic.
Example 2.4.10 (artificial neural networks). Artificial neural network (ANN) is a very popular bi-
ologically inspired technique in machine learning that is often used in pattern recognition [16][18].
Each ANN is a directed graph in which each edge e has weight w(e). Its nodes are called neurons
and its edges are called connections. If neuron η connects to neuron ζ via connection e, we say η
feeds into ζ via e (written η
e
−→ ζ), η is the presynaptic neuron of e, and ζ is the postsynaptic neuron
of e. Each neuron is either activated or not. Its state at time t+1 depends on the activation states at
time t of the neurons that feed into it. The exact update rule may vary in different neural networks,
but usually it is implemented as a linear threshold function:
Each neuron η has a threshold value T such that η is activated at time t+ 1 iff∑
ζ
e−→η
w(e) · ‖“ζ activated at time t”‖ > T.
Like in the previous example, ANNs can be represented by finite ǫ-models (M,D) with domD =
P(M) of the language L with binary relations I, D, and C. The measure D(a) of each element a of
M correspond to the weight w(a) in the ANN. If the threshold T is fixed across all neurons, then
the linear threshold update rule can be expressed in ǫF-logic.
We introduce new predicates actvt(x) that represents whether the presynaptic neuron of edge
x is activated at time t. It satisfies the following relations for each t.
1. “Suppose x and y have the same presynaptic neuron. Then actvt(x) holds iff actvt(y) holds”:
∀x∀y(D(x, y)→ [actvt(x)↔ actvt(y)]).
2. the linear threshold update rule:
∀x(actvt+1(x)↔ ∃
>T
y[I(y, x) ∧ actvt(y)]).
In a typical usage of ANN, there are two sets of distinguished neurons I and O called input
neurons and output neurons. At the beginning, each neuron of I is activated or deactivated according
to an input bitstring, for example derived from a digital image. All other neurons are not activated.
After some time t, the activation states of the neurons of O are returned as a bitstring. Continuing
our example, we might desire the output of 1 from every output neuron iff the image is of a butterfly.
Imagine we are interested in whether some property Φ of ANN implies some property Ψ. If we
can phrase Φ as a sentence to be interpreted under ǫF-logic and Ψ as a sentence to be interpreted
under ǫE-logic, then we can answer this question by querying for the ǫE-validity of
Φ ∧ Λ→ Ψ,
where Λ is the conjunction of the axioms of the graph from example (2.4.9) and the axioms of actvt
from this example.
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Unlike the example of PAC learning, we cannot say with certainty whether any or all of the
theories of finite graphs with weighted vertices, finite graphs with weighted edges, or finite artificial
neural networks are decidable. The main theorems of this paper will establish that the naive method
is out of the picture: there is no general deduction mechanism for ǫE- or ǫF-logics when restricted
to finite ǫ-models. In particular, this result holds even when restricted to first order languages with
a finite number of binary relations and an infinite number of unary predicates. But that is not
enough to determine the exact computability of the above theories, each of which uses only a finite
number of unary predicates. (Even for ANN, in almost all use cases, only a finite number of actvt
predicates are considered). Weakening the language requirement remains a major research area in
ǫE- and ǫF-logics.
Related to the issue of decidability is expressability. We note in passing that despite these exam-
ples, ǫE- and ǫF-logics still have nontrivial limitations in expression power. These limitations derive
in many cases from the limitations of first order logic itself. A detailed discussion of impossibility
results in expressability is outside the scope of this paper, but we mention that quite a few tech-
niques for first order logic, like locality, carry over to our probability logics. The interested reader
is advised to consult [15].
3 Validities and Satisfiabilities
3.1 Finite and Countable 0E-Satisfiabilities
In contrast to first order logic, where Trachtenbrot’s theorem implies that an effective calculus for
deducing true theorems over finite models cannot exist, we show here that finite and countable 0F-
validities are decidable. Moreover, the results of this subsection apply to any first order language.
Consequently, finite and countable 0E-satisfiability are also decidable regardless of language.
(Recall that ~x is a shorthand for a sequence of variables x1, x2, . . . , xn for some n ≥ 0, and ∀~x is
a shorthand for ∀x1∀x2 · · · ∀xn).
Lemma 3.1.1 (validity conversion). Let ▽i ∈ {∀, ∃} represent quantifiers, and
φ := ▽1x1▽2x2 · · ·▽nxnψ(~x)
where ψ is a quantifier free formula. Suppose I = {i1, i2, . . . , ik} ⊆ {1, . . . , n} is an enumeration of
all indices i such that ▽i = ∀. Define
φ∗(y) := ∀xi1∀xi2 · · · ∀xikψ(~y, xi1 ,~y, xi2 ,~y, . . . ,~y, xik ,~y),
where each ~y denote a block y, y, . . . , y of y repeated some number of times, depending on the location
of ~y. In other words, in φ∗, all xj with j 6∈ I has been substituted with the free variable y.
Let
φ′ := ∀yφ∗(y).
Then φ is finitely 0F-valid iff φ′ is finitely classically valid. φ is countably 0F-valid iff φ′ is
classically valid.
Proof. Let’s consider the finite validity claim of the theorem. The countable validity portion is
almost exactly the same.
(φ finitely 0F-valid =⇒ φ′ finitely classically valid) Let Vk be a classical model of size k, with
universe {1, 2, . . . , k}. Define measures Ei,k on it such that Ei,k(i) = 1 and Ei,k(j) = 0, ∀j 6= i. If
(Vk, Ei,k) ⊢0 φ, then all the xj , j 6∈ I (i.e. all those with an existential quantifier) must be interpreted
as i since i has measure 1. Hence (Vk, Ei,k) ⊢0 φ implies Vk |= φ∗(i).
Since φ is finitely 0F-valid, for any fixed k, (Vk, Ei,k) ⊢0 φ and thus Vk |= φ∗(i) hold for all
1 ≤ i ≤ k. Therefore,
Vk |= ∀yφ
∗(y) =⇒ Vk |= φ′
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Now vary k, and we conclude that φ′ is classically finitely valid.
Note that the above reasoning did not use finiteness in an essential way. In fact, slightly modifying
the argument shows that φ 0F-valid for all 0-models of size κ implies φ′ classically valid for all first
order models of size κ.
(φ′ finitely classically valid =⇒ φ finitely 0F-valid) Let (M,D) be a 0-model with the universe
M = {1, . . . , k}. By proposition (2.3.4), we can take D to be defined on all subsets of M . Since φ′ is
satisfied by all classical models, M |= φ′ =⇒ M |= ∀yφ∗(y). Because M is finite (this is the only
place where the finiteness is used; substitute countability for the countable case), there must be an
element a ∈ M with positive measure. Then M |= φ∗(a), meaning that all the ∃ bindings (with
the interpretation under ⊢ǫ of measure strictly positive) in φ are realized by a. Thus (M,D) ⊢0 φ.
Since (M,D) is an arbitrary finite 0-model, φ is finitely 0F-valid.
Lemma 3.1.2. Let
φ(~y) := ∀~xψ(~x, ~y)
be a universal formula, where ψ is quantifier free.
The following are equivalent:
1. φ is finitely classically valid.
2. φ is classically valid.
Proof. Certainly, (2) =⇒ (1). It suffices to show (1) =⇒ (2).
Because for any first order model M, M |= φ(~y) ⇐⇒ M |= ∀~yφ(~y), we assume that φ is a
sentence ∀~xψ(~x). Let n = |~x|.
Suppose φ is satisfied by all finite (classical) models but there is an infinite model M |= ¬φ.
Then there is a tuple ~a ∈Mn such thatM |= ¬ψ(~a). We form a finite modelM′ containing {ai}ni=1
such that M′ |= ¬ψ(~a), which would yield a contradiction.
Let F0 := {ai}ni=1 ∪ {c
M : c is a constant symbol that appears in φ}. Given Fi, set
Fi+1 := {f
M(ξ) : ξ ∈ Fi, f is a function symbol that appears in φ}
Then we define the universe of our model to be
M ′ =
k⋃
i=0
Fk ∪ {r}
where k is maximal number of times any function symbol appears in ψ, and r is an arbitrary new
element. F0 is obviously finite, and given Fi is finite, |Fi+1| ≤ |Fi| · |length(φ)| is finite. Thus each
Fi is finite and so M
′ is finite.
The relations in M′ will be the relations of M restricted to M ′. For each function symbol f in
the language, define
fM
′
(ξ) =
{
fM(ξ) if ξ ∈ Fi for some i < k
r otherwise
if f appears in ψ, and otherwise arbitrary. Finally, for each constant symbol c, the interpretation is
cM
′
=
{
cM if cM ∈ H
r otherwise
It’s easy to check that if t is a term that appears in ψ, then tM = tM
′
, and if R is an n-ary
relation that appears in ψ then RM(~ξ) = RM
′
(~ξ) for any ~ξ ∈ M ′n. Thus by induction M′ as
constructed satisfies ¬ψ(~a) as desired.
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But universal classical validities reduce to propositional tautologies: for each prime formula π
with n arguments, and each n-tuple ~x of variables in the language, form a propositional variable
pπ,~x. Then a universal formula ∀~yψ(~y, ~z) with ψ quantifier-free is valid iff ψ
prop, the propositional
formula where all instances of prime formulas π(~x) are replaced by the propositional variable pπ,~x, is
a propositional tautology. Since propositional validity is decidable, this combined with (3.1.2) yields
Theorem 3.1.3. For any first order language, the set of finitely 0F-valid formulas coincides with
the set of countably 0F-valid formulas. They are both decidable. Therefore, the set of finitely 0E-
satisfiable sentences coincides with the set of countably 0E-satisfiable sentences, and they are both
decidable.
3.2 Monadic Relational Language
Let L be a first order language
• with no equality,
• with no function symbols,
• with no relation of arity at least 2, and
• with at most a finite number of unary predicates P1, P2, . . . , Ps.
We call L a monadic relational language. In this subsection, we show that for any such language,
unrestricted, countable, and finite ǫE-satisfiabilites and ǫF-satisfiabilities are all decidable, ergo the
computability of ǫE-validities as well.
The essence of the proofs in this section resides in the fact that each ǫ-model in such a language
“has only a finite amount of information”: They are partitioned by the monadic predicates into a
finite number of indistinguishable parts, and the measures of these parts uniquely determine the
models up to ǫ-elementary equivalence. This observation allows us to reduce these satisfiability
problems to linear programming.
Lemma 3.2.1. Let L be monadic relational with unary predicates P1, P2, . . . , Ps. Suppose (M,D)
is an ǫ-model in L. Then there is a finite probability model (N , E) such that (M,D) ≡ǫ (N , E).
Furthermore, we can take the universe to be some subset N ⊆ P(JsK) and require that
for every a, b ∈ N , if PNl (a) holds when and only when P
N
l (b) holds, then a = b.
Proof. For each U ⊆ JsK, define the subset
MU := {a ∈M : ∀l ∈ JsK, P
M
l (a) ⇐⇒ l ∈ U}.
{MU}U⊆JsK partitions (M,D) into at most 2s disjoint parts. It should be immediate that for any
formula φ(x), any U ⊆ JsK, and a, b ∈MU ,
(M,D) |=ǫ φ(a) ⇐⇒ (M,D) |=ǫ φ(b). (∆)
Now we define (N , E). Let
N := {U :MU 6= ∅}
and let E be defined on points U by
E(U) = D(MU ).
Then
∑
U∈N E(U) = 1, so E is a probability measure.
Finally, define the interpretations PNl on N by
PNl (U) :⇐⇒ l ∈ U.
Since all subsets of N are E-measurable, (N , E) is a probability model.
For ǫ-elementary equivalence, we show the stronger claim that:
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For any quantifier-free formula φ(~x, ~y) with j = |~x| and k = |~y|, every ~U ∈ Nk, and every
sequence of quantifiers ▽1, . . . ,▽j ∈ {∃, ∀},
(N , E) |=ǫ ▽1x1 · · ·▽jxjφ(~x, ~U)
iff for all (and, by (∆), for any) ~a ∈M~U :=MU1 ×MU2 × · · · ×MUk ,
(M,D) |=ǫ ▽1x1 · · ·▽jxjφ(~x,~a).
We proceed by induction on the number j of quantifiers. The case of j = 0 is immediate by our
construction.
Suppose that our claim is proved for j = j′ ≥ 0. The case of ψ(~U) := ∃y▽1x1 · · ·▽j′xj′φ(~x, y, ~U)
does not involve measures and is obvious. For ψ(~U) := ∀y▽1x1 · · ·▽j′xj′φ(~x, y, ~U), (N , E) |=ǫ ψ(~U)
iff
W := {V : (N , E) |=ǫ ▽1x1 · · ·▽j′xj′φ(~x, V, ~U)}, E(W ) ≥ 1− ǫ.
By induction hypothesis,
W = {V : ∀a ∈MV , ∀~b ∈M~U , (M,D) |=ǫ ▽1x1 · · ·▽j′xj′φ(~x, a,
~b)}.
Therefore, for all ~b ∈M~U ,⋃
V ∈W
MV = {a : (M,D) |=ǫ ▽1x1 · · ·▽j′xj′φ(~x, a,~b)}
and thus
Pr
a∼D
[(M,D) |=ǫ ▽1x1 · · ·▽j′xj′φ(~x, a,~b)]
= Pr
a∼D
[a ∈
⋃
V ∈W
MV ]
=
∑
V ∈W
D(MV )
=
∑
V ∈W
E(V )
= E(W )
≥ 1− ǫ.
implying
(M,D) |=ǫ ∀y▽1x1 · · ·▽j′xj′φ(~x, y, ~U).
The converse direction follows by reversing this line of reasoning and applying (∆).
The claim starting from “Furthermore” follows by our construction.
We introduce the concept of ǫE- and ǫF-trees to help us analyze satisfiability of sentences.
Definition 3.2.2. Let M be a set. A tree in M with height n is defined as a tree T with n levels
(from 1 to n) with the following properties
1. all nodes are subsets of M .
2. if node V is at level k < n, then V has a child V ≻x for each x ∈ V , and these are all of V ’s
children.
3. if node V is at level n, then V has no children; V is called a leaf node of T .
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The unique root of T is denoted rootT . A bran of a tree in M with height n is defined as a
sequence 〈(ai, Vi)〉ni=1 of pairs, where for each i,
1. Vi ⊆M is a node of T at level i,
2. ai ∈ Vi, and
3. Vi+1 = Vi
≻ai if i < n.
We will also write 〈ai ∈ Vi〉ni=1 for a bran, which should not cause any confusion.
Definition 3.2.3. Let Q = 〈▽1,▽2, . . . ,▽n〉 be a sequence of quantifiers from {∃, ∀}. Let (M,D)
be an ǫ-model. An ǫE-tree in (M,D) with levels Q is defined as a tree in M with height n such
that:
1. if ▽k = ∃, then all nodes at level k are nonempty subsets of M ; level k is called a ∃-level.
2. if ▽k = ∀, then all nodes at level k are D-measurable subsets of M with D-measure at least
1− ǫ; level k is called a ∀-level.
Let Φ := ▽1x1 · · ·▽nxnφ(~x) where φ is quantifier-free. An ǫE-tree in (M,D) for Φ is defined
as an ǫE-tree in (M,D) with levels 〈▽1, . . . ,▽n〉 with the additional property that
(S) for every bran 〈ai ∈ Vi〉
n
i=1,
M |= φ(~a).
When Φ (or Q) and (M,D) are clear from the context, we will simply use the term ǫE-tree.
Example 3.2.4. If Q = 〈∃, ∀, ∃〉, M = J4K, and D is the uniform distribution, then
{1}
{1, 2, 3}
{2} {3} {4}
is an 12E-tree in (M,D) with levels Q.
If Φ = ∃x∀y∃z[x + y = z] (where x + y = z should be treated as a relation over (x, y, z)), then
the above tree is also an 12E-tree in (M,D) for Φ.
Note that nodes across a level need not be distinct. For example, if Φ = ∀x∃y[x 6= y], then
{1, 2, 3}
{2} {1, 3} {2}
would be a valid 12E-tree in (M,D) for Φ.
Similarly, we define
Definition 3.2.5. Let Q = 〈▽1,▽2, . . . ,▽n〉 be a sequence of quantifiers from {∃, ∀}. Let (M,D)
be an ǫ-model. An ǫF-tree in (M,D) with levels Q is defined as a tree in M with height n such
that:
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1. if ▽k = ∃, then all nodes at level k are D-measurable subsets of M with D-measure greater
than ǫ; level k is called a ∃-level.
2. if ▽k = ∀, then all nodes at level k are M ; level k is called a ∀-level.
Let Φ := ▽1x1 · · ·▽nxnφ(~x) where φ is quantifier-free. An ǫF-tree in (M,D) for Φ is defined
as an ǫF-tree in (M,D) with levels 〈▽1, . . . ,▽n〉 with the additional property that
(S) for every bran 〈ai ∈ Vi〉ni=1,
M |= φ(~a).
When Φ and (M,D) are clear from the context, we will simply use the term ǫF-tree.
Example 3.2.6. With the same setting as above of Q = 〈∃, ∀, ∃〉, M = J4K, and D the uniform
distribution,
{1}
{1, 2, 3}
{2} {3} {4}
is not a 12F-tree in (M,D) with levels Q because the root {1} has measure
1
4 <
1
2 and the second
level node is not all of M . However, the following is a 12F-tree with levels in 〈∃, ∀〉:
{1, 2, 3}
J4K J4K J4K
If Φ = ∀x∃y[x 6= y], then
{1, 2, 3, 4}
{3, 4} {1, 2}
{3, 4} {1, 2}
is a 14F-tree for Φ, but not a
1
2F-tree. As an exercise, the reader should verify that there is no
3
4F-tree for Φ in our choice of (M,D). Note once again that, as this example illustates, nodes across
the same level in an ǫF-tree need not be distinct.
It should be apparent from the definitions and examples that
Proposition 3.2.7. For any first order language L, let Φ be an L-sentence and (M,D) be an ǫ-
model of L. Then (M,D) |=ǫ Φ iff there exists an ǫE-tree in (M,D) for Φ. Similarly, (M,D) ⊢ǫ Φ
iff there exists an ǫF-tree in (M,D) for Φ.
Therefore, Φ is (unrestricted/finitely/countably) ǫE-satisfiable iff there exists an ǫE-tree in some
(unrestricted/finite/countable) (M,D) for Φ. This statement holds also when F substitutes E.
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Now we are ready to tackle the decidability of monadic relational languages.
Theorem 3.2.8. Let L be a monadic relational first order language and ǫ ∈ [0, 1] be a rational
number. Then ǫE-satisfiability in L is decidable for the unrestricted, the countable, and the finite
cases.
Proof. By lemma (3.2.1), all three ǫE-satisfiability follow from the finite case, so we will prove the
latter. In particular, it suffices to consider only satisfaction by probability models (M,D) with
universe M ⊆ P(JsK), with D everywhere defined, and with the property that
∀a, b ∈M, [∀l ∈ JsK, PMl (a) ⇐⇒ P
M
l (b)] =⇒ a = b.
Call such models simple models.
Let Φ be a sentence in L, without loss of generality in prenex normal form
Φ := ▽1x1 · · ·▽nxnφ(~x)
where φ(~x) is quantifier-free and each ▽i is a quantifier.
By proposition (3.2.7), Φ is ǫE-satisfiable by simple models iff there is an ǫE-tree in some simple
(M,D) for Φ. But all such trees are trees in some subset of P(JsK) with height n, which are finite
in number. Thus, we only need to devise an algorithm that, for any M˙ ⊆ P(JsK) and any tree T in
M˙ with height n, tests whether there exists simple model (M,D) with universe M˙ such that T is
an ǫE-tree in (M,D) for Φ — and it suffices to verify definition (3.2.3). But M˙ is the universe of
some such simple model (M,D) iff M˙ is so with the interpretations
∀U ∈ M˙, PMl (U) ⇐⇒ l ∈ U.
Thus, assuming this structure ofM, we can check conditions (1) and (S) of definition (3.2.3) imme-
diately, in finite time.
Finally, for any surviving T and M with universe M˙ , we find whether there exists a probability
measure D everywhere defined such that T satisfies condition (2). (M,D) fulfills this condition iff
for every node V ⊆ M˙ at a ∀-level in T , ∑
a∈V
D(a) ≥ 1− ǫ. (⋄V )
This is equivalent, then, to the feasibility of the linear program LP with variables µa for every a ∈ M˙
and inequalities
1. (⋄V ) with µa replacing D(a),
2. µa ≥ 0, for each a ∈ M˙ , and
3.
∑
a∈M˙ µa = 1.
Evidently, because ǫ is rational, all coefficients in LP are rational. By proposition (1.1.1), LP is
solvable in finite time.
Thus condition (2) can be verified effectively.
The corresponding result for ǫF-logic will proceed similarly, except that the linear program will
involve strict inequalities. The following result of Carver is needed to prove the next lemma.
Proposition 3.2.9 (Carver [19]). Let A be a matrix and let b be a column vector. There exists a
vector x with Ax < b iff y = 0 is the only solution for
y ≥ 0, yA = 0, yb ≤ 0.
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Lemma 3.2.10. Let A and B be matrices and let b and c be column vectors. If all entries in
A,B, b, c are rational, then there is an algorithm that decides the feasibility of the system
Ax < b, Bx = c.
Proof. Solve Bx = c for x (for example by Gaussian elimination). If there is no solution x, then
the system is not feasible. If there is exactly one solution x, we check whether x satisfies Ax < b
and return the result. Finally, if the solution set forms an affine plane of dimension d, then there
exist d indices i1, . . . , id such that each coordinate xk is a linear combination of xi1 , . . . , xid and
1. Substituting these equations into Ax < b yields a new (strict) linear program A′x′ < b′ with
rational coefficients where x′ = (xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xid). Evidently the feasibility of the original system is
equivalent to the feasibility of A′x′ < b′, which can be solved via Carver’s theorem and proposition
(1.1.1).
Now we are ready to characterize the monadic relational fragment of ǫF-logic. The method of
proof follows roughly the same path as for theorem (3.2.8).
Theorem 3.2.11. Let L be a monadic relational first order language and ǫ ∈ [0, 1) be a rational
number. Then ǫF-satisfiability in L is decidable for the unrestricted, the countable, and the finite
cases.
Proof. Let Φ be a sentence in prenex normal form.
Again, by lemma (3.2.1), it suffices to consider only the finite case and only satisfaction by
probability models (M,D) with universe M ⊆ P(JsK), with D everywhere defined, and with the
property that
∀a, b ∈M, [∀l ∈ JsK, PMl (a) ⇐⇒ P
M
l (b)] =⇒ a = b.
Call such models simple models.
Just as in the proof of theorem (3.2.8), it’s enough to check in finite time, for each M˙ ⊆ P(JsK)
and each tree T in M˙ , whether there is a simple (M,D) with universe M˙ such that T is an ǫF-tree
in (M,D) for Φ. If (M,D) is some such model, then T ′ is an ǫF-tree in (M′,D′) for Φ, where
• M ′ is the set of nonnull elements of M˙ ,
• D′ is the restriction of D to M ′, and
• T ′ is derived from T by restricting every node V ⊆ M˙ of T to M ′.
Therefore we may consider only D that is everywhere positive.
Again, we can assume M to have interpretations
PMl (U) ⇐⇒ l ∈ U
for each U ∈ M˙ and l ∈ JsK. So conditions (2) and (S) of definition (3.2.5) can be easily verified.
Finally, for any surviving T and M with universe M˙ , we find whether there exists a probability
measure D everywhere defined such that T satisfies condition (1). Thus T is an ǫF-tree in (M,D)
iff for every node V ⊆ M˙ at an ∃-level in T ,∑
a∈V
D(a) > ǫ. (◦V )
The existence of such D is equivalent to the feasibility of the strict linear program LP with variables
µa for every a ∈ M˙ and inequalities
1. (◦V ) with µa replacing D(a),
28
Greg Yang 3.3. Q-SENTENCE, Q-TREES, AND Q-SATISFIABILITY
2. µa > 0, for each a ∈ M˙ , and
3.
∑
a∈M˙ µa = 1.
By lemma (3.2.10), this is decidable.
By duality, we can phrase theorems (3.2.8) and (3.2.11) thus
Corollary 3.2.12. Let L be any monadic relational first order language and ǫ ∈ (0, 1) be a rational
number. Then for X = E or F, (unrestricted/countable/finite) ǫX-satisifiability and validity are both
decidable.
3.3 q-Sentence, q-Trees, and q-Satisfiability
Here we generalize the various concepts of ǫE and ǫF like trees and satisfiability. These generaliza-
tions will allow us to express computability reduction results in the next section.
Definition 3.3.1. For any first order language L, a q-sentence in L is defined as a string of the
form
▽1x1 · · ·▽nxnφ(~x)
where φ is a quantifier-free L-formula in n variables, and for each i,
▽i ∈ QSET := {∃, ∀} ∪ {Q
≥
ǫ }ǫ∈Q∩[0,1] ∪ {Q>ǫ }ǫ∈Q∩[0,1].
Quantifiers of the form Q≥ǫ are called weak q-quantifiers. Quantifiers of the form Q>ǫ are called
strong q-quantifiers.
If q-sentence Φ has no strong q-quantifiers and no ∀, then Φ is called a qE-sentence. In the
same way, if Φ has no weak q-quantifiers and no ∃, then Φ is called a qF-sentence.
Definition 3.3.2. Let Φ := ▽1x1 · · ·▽nxnφ(~x) be a first order logic sentence, with ▽i ∈ {∃, ∀} and
φ quantifier-free. The ǫE-coercion of Φ is defined as the q-sentence
ǫE-coerce(Φ) := ▽′1x1 · · ·▽
′
nxnφ(~x)
where
▽
′
i =
{
∃ if ▽i = ∃
Q≥1−ǫ if ▽i = ∀.
Likewise, the ǫF-coercion of Φ is defined as the q-sentence
ǫF-coerce(Φ) := ▽′1x1 · · ·▽
′
nxnφ(~x)
where
▽
′
i =
{
∀ if ▽i = ∀
Q>ǫ if ▽i = ∃.
For an arbitrary first order sentence Φ, its ǫE-coercion is the coercion of the equivalent prenex
normal form. Similarly for ǫF-coercion.
Clearly, both coercion functions are computable. In addition, every q-sentence in the image of
ǫE-coerce is a qE-sentence, and every q-sentence in the image of ǫF-coerce is a qF-sentence.
Definition 3.3.3. Let Q = 〈▽1,▽2, . . . ,▽n〉 be a sequence of quantifiers from QSET. Let M be a
first order model and D be a probability measure on its universe M . An q-tree in (M,D) with
levels Q is defined as a tree in M with height n such that:
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1. if ▽k = ∃, then all nodes at level k are nonempty subsets of M ; level k is called a ∃-level.
2. if ▽k = ∀, then all nodes at level k are M ; level k is called a ∀-level.
3. if ▽k = Q
≥
ǫ , then all nodes at level k are subsets of M with D-measure at least ǫ; level k is
called a Q≥ǫ -level.
4. if ▽k = Q
>
ǫ , then all nodes at level k are subsets of M with D-measure greater than ǫ; level k
is called a Q>ǫ -level.
Let Φ := ▽1x1 · · ·▽nxnφ(~x) be a q-sentence. A q-tree in (M,D) for Φ is defined as a q-tree
in (M,D) with levels 〈▽1, . . . ,▽n〉 with the additional property that
(S) for every bran 〈ai ∈ Vi〉ni=1,
M |= φ(~a).
When Φ and (M,D) are clear from the context, we will simply use the term q-tree.
Example 3.3.4. Let M = J4K and D be the uniform distribution. The following q-tree in (M,D)
{1}
{1, 2, 3}
{2} {3} {4}
is a q-tree with levels Q for Q = 〈∃,Q≥3/4 ,Q
>
0 〉, 〈Q
≥
1/4 , ∃, ∃〉, and 〈Q
>
0 ,Q
>
1/2 ,Q
≥
0 〉, but not for Q =
〈∃, ∀, ∃〉 or 〈Q>1/2 ,Q
>
3/4 ,Q
>
1/4〉. Thus T can be an ǫE-tree with levels Q but not necessarily be a q-tree
with levels Q, as ∀ is interpreted differently.
It is also a q-tree for Φ if Φ = ∃xQ>1/2y∃z[x+ y = z] but not if Φ = ∃x∀y∃z[x+ y = z].
The following q-tree in (M,D)
{1, 2, 3, 4}
{3, 4} {1, 2}
{3, 4} {1, 2}
is a q-tree with levels Q for Q = 〈∀, ∃〉 and 〈Q≥1 ,Q
>
1/4〉 but not for Q = 〈∃, ∀〉 or 〈∀,Q
>
1/2〉.
It is also a q-tree for Φ if Φ = ∀x∃y[x 6= y] or Q≥1 xQ
>
0 y[x 6= y] but not if Φ = ∀x∀y[x 6= y] or
∀xQ≥3/4y[x 6= y].
Clearly, q-trees are generalizations of both ǫE-trees and ǫF-trees: An ǫE-tree in (M,D) for Φ is
exactly a q-tree in (M,D) for ǫE-coerce(Φ). Likewise for ǫF-trees.
Definition 3.3.5. A pair (M,D) of first order model M and probability measure D on M is said
to q-satisfy a q-sentence Φ := ▽1x1 · · ·▽nxnφ(~x), written
(M,D) |=q Φ,
if there exists a q-tree in (M,D) for Φ.
A q-sentence Φ is said to be q-satisfiable if some (M,D) q-satisfies Φ.
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Again, q-satisfiability is just a generalization of ǫE- and ǫF-satisfibiliy: for a first order sentence
Ψ,
(M,D) |=ǫ Ψ ⇐⇒ (M,D) |=
q ǫE-coerce(Ψ).
The obvious analogue holds for ǫF-satisfiability as well.
Definition 3.3.6. Let Q = 〈▽1, . . . ,▽n〉 and Q′ = 〈▽′1, . . . ,▽
′
m〉. Let (M,D) be a pair of first order
model and probability measure. Suppose T and T ′ are q-trees in (M,D) respectively with levels Q
and Q′. The wedge product T ∧ T ′ is defined as the q-tree with levels 〈▽1, . . . ,▽n,▽′1, . . . ,▽
′
m〉
(thus of height n+m) constructed as follows:
For every leaf node V in T and every element a ∈ V , set a copy of T ′ as the subtree
under a.
The expression T1 ∧ T2 ∧ · · · ∧ Tk is parsed as
(((T1 ∧ T2) ∧ · · · ) ∧ Tk).
Example 3.3.7. Let T be
{1, 2, 3}
{2, 3} {3} {1, 4}
and T ′ be the singleton tree {1}. Then T ∧ T ′ is the q-tree
{1, 2, 3}
{2, 3} {3} {1, 4}
{1} {1} {1} {1} {1}
Proposition 3.3.8. Let Φ := ▽1x1 · · ·▽nxnφ(~x) and Φ′ := ▽′1y1 · · ·▽
′
mymφ
′(~y) be q-sentences. Let
(M,D) be a pair of first order model and probability measure. Suppose T and T ′ are q-trees in
(M,D) respectively for Φ and Φ′. Then T ∧ T ′ is a q-tree in (M,D) for the q-sentence
▽1x1 · · ·▽nxn▽
′
1y1 · · ·▽
′
mym[φ(~x) ∧ φ
′(~y)].
Proof. We verify definition (3.3.3). Conditions (1), (2), (3), and (4) follow easily from the respective
conditions on T and T ′.
Each bran of T ∧ T ′ is a concatenation
〈a1 ∈ V1, . . . , an ∈ Vn, b1 ∈W1, . . . , bm ∈ Wm〉
of a bran 〈ai ∈ Vi〉ni=1 of T and a bran 〈bi ∈ Wi〉
m
i=1 of T
′. Thus
(M,D) |=q φ(~a) ∧ φ′(~b)
by T and T ′’s property (S). So condition (S) holds for T ∧ T ′ as well.
This proposition immediately yields
Proposition 3.3.9. Let Φ and Φ′ be as above. A pair (M,D) simultaneously q-satisfies Φ and Φ′
iff
(M,D) |=q ▽1x1 · · ·▽nxn▽
′
1y1 · · ·▽
′
mym[φ(~x) ∧ φ
′(~y)].
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3.4 Finite ǫE-satisfiability
In this subsection we will show that ǫE-satisfiability is Σ01-complete for rational ǫ strictly between
0 and 1. The main reason that we would like to work with rational ǫ is the following set of tools
provided by Kuyper and Terwijn:
Lemma 3.4.1 (Kuyper-Terwijn inter-reduction [13][10]). Let
• L be a countable first-order language not containing function symbols or equality,
• L′ be the language obtained by adding an infinite number of unary predicates to L, and
• ǫ0, ǫ1 be rational such that
1. 0 ≤ ǫ0 ≤ ǫ1 < 1, or
2. 0 < ǫ1 ≤ ǫ0 ≤ 1.
Then there is a computable f mapping L-sentences to L′-sentences such that φ is ǫ0E-satisfiable
iff f(φ) is ǫ1E-satisfiable.
More generally 4, this reduction works “per quantifier”: For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1) ∩ Q, there exists
a computable function Fǫ mapping qE-sentences in L to L′-sentences such that the following are
equivalent:
1. there exists a pair (M,D) such that
(M,D) |=q Φ.
2. Fǫ(Φ) is ǫE-satisfiable.
Even though the theorem only applies to full satisfiability, the proof works exactly the same
for finite (and countable) satisfiability, because the only model construction in the proof is the
duplication of a given satisfying model a finite number of times, which preserves finiteness (and
countability). Thus
Lemma 3.4.2. Let L and L′ be defined as above. For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q, there exists a computable
function Fǫ mapping qE-sentences in L to L′-sentences such that the following are equivalent:
1. there exists a pair (M,D) with M finite such that
(M,D) |=q Φ.
2. Fǫ(Φ) is finitely ǫE-satisfiable.
In particular, we are interested in the following case
Lemma 3.4.3. Let L and L′ be defined as above and fix rational ǫ ∈ (0, 1). There is a computable
function fǫ such that, for any finite set of rationals J ⊆ Q ∩ [0, 1] and L-sentences {Ψα}α∈J , the
following are equivalent:
1. there exists a pair (M,D) such that, for each α ∈ J , (M,D) is a finite α-model and
(M,D) |=α Ψα.
2. fǫ({Ψα}α∈J) is finitely ǫE-satisfiable.
4see [13, remark 2.14].
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Proof. We have
(M,D) |=α Ψα ⇐⇒ (M,D) |=
q ǫE-coerce(Ψα).
By repeated applications of proposition (3.3.9), (M,D) simultaneously q-satisfies all ǫE-coerce(Ψα)
iff (M,D) |=q Γ for some q-sentence Γ. Now apply lemma (3.4.2).
Therefore, we could compute the simultaneous E-satisfiability over different error parameters
α ∈ [0, 1] by using only one fixed ǫ ∈ (0, 1). This property of ǫ ∈ (0, 1) turns out to be powerful
enough to allow the encoding of the halting set by sentences in ǫE-logic. It also distinguishes the
case of ǫ ∈ (0, 1) from the case of ǫ = 0, for which lemma (3.4.3) is not applicable: whereas the
E-satisfiability of the latter is decidable by theorem (3.1.3), that of the former, as will be shown
next, is Σ01-complete.
We now commence the first half of the completeness proof.
Theorem 3.4.4. Let L be any countable first-order language with an infinite number of unary
predicates and at least three binary predicates. Finite ǫE-satisfiability for L-sentences is Σ01-hard for
rational 1 > ǫ > 0.
Proof. The main idea of the proof, as remarked above, is that we want to reduce the halting problem
to finite ǫE-satisfiability. Specifically we will show that there is a reduction from the set of Turing
machines that halt on empty input (which is Σ01-complete) to the set of finite ǫE-satisfiables. The
proof is loosely based on the proof of Trachtenbrot’s theorem in Libkin [15, p. 166] and the proof
of Σ11-hardness of ǫE-satisfaction in Kuyper [10, Thm. 7.6]. Since by theorem (3.4.3) there is a
reduction between finite ǫ0E- and ǫ1E-satisfiability in L for any rational ǫ0, ǫ1 ∈ (0, 1), it suffices to
establish the case of ǫ = 12 .
Suppose that M = (Q,∇, δ, q0, Qa, Qr) is a single-tape Turing machine, where
• Q is the set of states,
• ∇ is the tape alphabet,
• q0 is the initial state,
• Qa and Qr are respectively the sets of accepting and rejecting states, and
• δ : Q×∇ → Q×∇× {L,R} is the transition function.
Since we are only interested in Turing machines with empty input, ∇ can be assumed WLOG to
be {0, 1} with 0 representing the blank symbol.
In what follows, we break into three sections the proof for encoding the halting of M as a finite
1
2E-satisfiability problem. Section 1 describes the first order language used. Section 2 constructs the
sentence Ψ which is finitely 12E-satisfiability iff M halts. Finally section 3 proves that Ψ indeed has
such a property.
Part 1 (The vocabulary). We define vocabulary
σ := {min,max, N(·),+, <,R(·, ·), T (·, ·), H(·, ·), (Sq(·))q∈Q}.
(The constants min,max in σ can be replaced by unary predicates, so the theorem as stated will
still stand.)
The intuition behind this vocabulary, which will be formalized by the axioms below, is as follows:
• Elements satisfying N will be “roughly” a set of positive measure, linearly ordered (by <)
elements that will be our measure of time and space, such that min and max are the minimal
and the maximal elements of this chain — “Roughly”, because using ǫE-logic, we cannot
specify that elements of measure 0 do not satisfy N (in fact, we cannot say anything about
elements of measure 0). A nontrivial part of this proof is used to maneuver around these
“phantom elements”.
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• + is a binary relation mimicking equality. We avoid using true equality so that we can use the
computable reductions of theorem (3.4.3).
• T (p, t), where p, t ∈ N , represents that at time t, there is a 1 at position p on the tape.
• H(p, t), where p, t ∈ N , represents that at time t, the head of the machine is at position p.
• Sq(t), where t ∈ N , represents that at time t, the state of the machine is q.
• R is an auxiliary relation that is used to force certain measures to be equal. Its purpose will
become more clear over the course of the proof.
Part 2 (The encoding sentence). In this section we define the sentence Ψ that encodes whether M
will halt. Ψ will be of the form
Ψ := f({Tα}α∈J)
where
• J = {0, 14 ,
1
2 ,
3
4}
• f is the reduction function fǫ from lemma (3.4.3) for J and ǫ =
1
2 , and
• Tα is a sentence for each α ∈ J .
Thus Ψ is finitely ǫ0E-satisfiable iff each Tα is finitely αE-satisfiable.
For a formula φ in prenex normal form, we recursively define φN (called φ relativized to N):
1. if φ is quantifier-free, then φN = φ
2. if φ(~y) = ∀xψ(x, ~y), then φ(~y)N = ∀x(N(x)→ ψ(x, ~y)N )
3. if φ(~y) = ∃xψ(x, ~y), then φ(~y)N = ∃x(N(x) ∧ ψ(x, ~y)N ).
(T0). T0 will consist of the conjunction of the following sentences (because ∀x here should be
interpreted as “for almost all x”, or, as we only deal with finite models here, as “for all x with
positive measure,” we will write ∀
+
for the sake of clarity):
1. All axioms of equality:
(a) + is an equivalence relation:
∀
+
x(x + x)
∀
+
x∀
+
y(x + y → y + x)
∀
+
x∀
+
y ∀
+
z(x + y ∧ y + z → x + z)
(b) the indiscernability of identicals: for each atomic formula π,
π(a1, . . . , an) ∧
n∧
i=1
ai + bi → π(b1, . . . , bn)
2. < is a linear order on all elements of N with nonzero measure:
(∀
+
x ∀
+
y(x + y ∨ x < y ∨ y < x))N
(∀
+
x ∀
+
y(¬x + y → (x < y ↔ ¬y < x)))N
(∀
+
x∀
+
y ∀
+
z(x < y ∧ y < z → x < z))N
34
Greg Yang 3.4. FINITE ǫE-SATISFIABILITY
3. min and max are respectively minimal and maximal in <:
N(min) ∧N(max)
(∀
+
x(x + min ∨min < x))N
(∀
+
x(x + max ∨ x < max))N
4. Initially, M is in state q0, the head is in the first position, and the tape has all zeros:
Sq0(min)
∀
+
p(p + min↔ H(p,min))
(∀
+
p¬T (p,min))N
5. For any time t, M is in a unique state:

∀
+
t

∨
q∈Q
Sq(t) ∧
∧
q,q′∈Q
¬(Sq(t) ∧ Sq′(t))




N
6. A set of sentences encoding the transition function δ.
First we define a binary relation ≻. The expression t′ ≻ t is a shorthand for the conjunction
of
• “t′ is greater than t”
t < t′
• “for all s, s is less than t′ iff s is at most t”
∀
+
s(s < t′ ↔ (s < t ∨ s + t))
• “for all s, s is greater than t iff s is at least t′”
∀
+
s(t < s↔ (t′ < s ∨ t′ + s)).
Thus t′ ≻ t says that “t′ is a successor or t.”
For any formula φ(t, ~x), let φ(t+1, ~x) be defined as the shorthand for the following relativized
implication
[∀
+
t′(t′ ≻ t→ φ(t′, ~x))]N .
Hence φ(t+ 1, ~x) states that “φ holds for the successor of t”:
Similarly, let φ(t− 1, ~x) be defined as the shorthand for
[∀
+
t′(t ≻ t′ → φ(t′, ~x))]N .
The expression φ(t − 1, ~x) asserts that “φ holds for the predecessor of t.”
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These shorthands are well-defined when applied to multiple variables. For example, φ(p−1, t+
1) is the shorthand for
[∀
+
p′(p ≻ p′ → φ(p′, t+ 1))]N
7→ [∀
+
p′(p ≻ p′ → [∀
+
t′(t′ ≻ t→ φ(p′, t′))]N )]N
≡ [∀
+
p′ ∀
+
t′(p ≻ p′ ∧ t′ ≻ t→ φ(p′, t′))]N
where in the middle 7→ means “expands into.”
Now we turn to the task of encoding the transition function.
Suppose the transition function has rule δ(q, w) = (q′, w′, S) for some q ∈ Q;w,w′ ∈ ∇;S ∈
{L,R}. For each q and w, we define the sentence
ρq,w := [∀
+
p ∀
+
t(cond(p, t)→ trans(p, t))]N
where cond and trans are constructed as follows.
(a) cond(p, t) checks that “the machine M at time t has state q, has its head pointing at
cell p, and the character under the head is w”: explicitly, cond(p, t) is the conjunction
of the following:
i. “The state of M is q at time t”
Sq(t)
ii. “The head of M is above cell p”
H(p, t)
iii. “The character at cell p is w” (exactly one of the following sentences belongs to the
conjunction, depending on which condition is satisfied){
T (p, t) if w = 1
¬T (p, t) if w = 0
(b) trans(p, t) asserts that “M at time t + 1 has state q′ and has moved S from cell p;
the cell at p now contains the symbol w′”: explicitly, trans(p, t) is the conjunction of
the following (in every set of alternatives, exactly one of the sentences belongs to the
conjunction, depending on which condition is satisfied):
i. “The state of M is q′ at time t+ 1”
Sq′(t+ 1)
ii. “At time t+ 1: If S = R, the head of M is at cell p+ 1. If S = L and p = min, the
head of M is at cell min. Otherwise, the head of M is at cell p− 1.”{
H(p+ 1, t+ 1) if S = R
(p + min→ H(p, t+ 1)) ∧ (¬p + min→ H(p+ 1, t+ 1) if S = L
iii. “At time t+ 1, cell p contains symbol w′”{
T (p, t+ 1) if w′ = 1
¬T (p, t+ 1) if w′ = 0
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iv. “All cells other than those involved in (6(b)ii) are unaffected”.

∀
+
p′[¬p′ + p ∧ ¬p′ ≻ p→ (T (p′, t)↔ T (p′, t+ 1))] if S = R
∀
+
p′[¬p′ + p ∧ ¬p ≻ p′ → (T (p′, t)↔ T (p′, t+ 1))] if S = L
7. We assert that at time max, M arrives at an accepting or rejecting state:∨
q∈Qa∪Qr
Sq(max)
8. For reasons that will become clear later, for all x, y of positive measure, we need to let R(x, y)
hold only when y is not in N :
∀
+
x∀
+
y(R(x, y)→ ¬N(y))
This finishes the description of the sentence T0.
(T 1
4
and T 3
4
). T 1
4
and T 3
4
are respectively the sentences ∀x(x = min) and ∀x(x 6= min).
f 1
4
(T 1
4
) and f 3
4
(T 3
4
) are simultaneously 12E-satisfiable iff the measure of min is at least
3
4 and the
measure of all other elements is at least 14 . Thus T 14 and T
3
4
force the measure of min to be exactly
1
4 .
(T 1
2
). T 1
2
is the following conjunction of sentences (because the ∀x here should be interpreted
as “for a set of x with measure at least 12”, we write ∀≥1/2
for the sake of clarity):
1. the set of elements in N takes up measure exactly 12 :
∀
≥1/2
xN(x) ∧ ∀
≥1/2
x¬N(x)
2. we want each element of N to have measure equal to the total measure of all greater elements.
This is where the padding relation R is used.
First, for φ(x) a formula of a single free variable x, we define the following shorthand
p ∀
>0
x ∈ N(φ(x))q := ∀
≥1/2
x(N(x) ∧ φ(x))
The RHS says “for a set X of measure at least 1/2, X ⊆ N and every element of X satisfies
φ.” If we assume that (1) is 12E-satisfied, then p ∀>0x ∈ N(φ(x))q is equivalent to “all elements
in N of positive measure must satisfy φ.”
Secondly, for formula ψ(y, ~x), we define the following shorthand
pPr
y
[ψ(y, ~x)] = 1/2q := [ ∀
≥1/2
yψ(y, ~x)] ∧ [ ∀
≥1/2
y′¬ψ(y′, ~x)]
The conjuncts on the right respectively assert that “the probability of y satisfying ψ(y, ~x)
is at least 1/2” and “the probability of y′ not satisfying ψ(y′, ~x) is at least 1/2.” Hence
pPry[ψ(y, ~x)] = 1/2q says that “the probability of y satisfying ψ(y, ~x) is exactly 1/2.
Finally, we define the actual sentences in the conjunction of T 1
2
:
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(Recall that ∧ has precedence over ∨ for parsing)
p ∀
>0
x ∈ N(x + max ∨ pPr
y
[R(x, y) ∨N(y) ∧ x < y] = 1/2q)q
p ∀
>0
x ∈ N(x + max ∨ pPr
y
[R(x, y) ∨ x + y] = 1/2q)q
If clause (8) of T0 is 0E-satisfied (“If R(x, y) holds then y has measure 0 or is not in N”),
then the disjuncts R(x, y) and N(y) ∧ x < y are disjoint. Therefore, the above two sentences
together express “for all x in N that’s not max and not null, the measure of the strict final
segment of x is the same as the probability of x itself; they are both (12−Pry[R(x, y)]).” Forcing
the equality of these two measures is the purpose of the predicate R(·, ·), which has otherwise
no uses.
This concludes the construction of the reducing sentence Ψ.
Part 3 (The reduction). Now we show that M halts if and only if Ψ has a finite E-satisfying model.
(M halts =⇒ Ψ satisfiable). Suppose M halts in time m. We define the finite satisfying
model (W ,D) thus:
◦ Let the universe W be the set {1, 2, . . . , 2m}.
◦ Let +W be true equality =.
◦ Let NW be {1, 2, . . . ,m}
◦ Let a <W b for a, b ∈W be defined to agree with the natural ordering on W .
◦ Let minW = 1 and maxW = m.
◦ Define the measure D(i) = D(i +m) = 2−i−1 for i ∈ [1,m− 1], and define D(m) = D(2m) =
2−m.
◦ Define RW(i, j) iff i ≥ j −m ≥ 1
◦ Define HW(i, j) iff j ≤ m and M ’s head is at position i at time j.
◦ Define TW(i, j) iff j ≤ m and the tape’s symbol at position i at time j is 1.
◦ Define SWq (i) iff M is in state q at time i.
Since all elements of W have positive measure, all ∀ quantifiers in T0 are interpreted classically.
Therefore one can easily check that (W ,D) 0E-satisfies T0.
As min = 1 has measure 14 , T 14 and T
3
4
are satisfied.
NW obviously has measure 1/2, so the first clause of T 1
2
is satisfied.
Finally, consider clauses (2) in T 1
2
.
For a fixed i < m, the measure of {j : RW(i, j)} is
∑i
k=1 2
−k−1 = 2−1− 2−i−1, and the measure
of j ∈ NW such that i < j is
∑m−1
k=i+1 2
−k−1 + 2−m = 2−i−1. Thus, for this fixed i,
Pr
j∼D
[R(i, j) ∨N(j) ∧ i < j] =
1
2
.
Letting i vary, we can conclude that “for all x in NW0 , either x is max
W or the probability of y
such that R(x, y) ∨N(y) ∧ x < y holds is exactly 1/2.” In other words, the following clause in T 1
2
p ∀
>0
x ∈ N(x + max ∨ pPr
y
[R(x, y) ∨N(y) ∧ x < y] = 1/2q)q
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holds in (W ,D).
Similarly, as D(i) = 2−i−1 for any i < m,
Pr
j∼D
[R(i, j) ∨ i + j] =
1
2
,
so the following clause in T 1
2
p ∀
>0
x ∈ N(x + max ∨ pPr
y
[R(x, y) ∨ x + y] = 1/2q)q
is 12E-satisfied by (W ,D).
Therefore (W ,D) 12E-satisfies all of T 12 , as desired.
(M halts ⇐= Ψ satisfiable). Let (W ,D) be a finite 12 -model. By proposition (2.3.4), we can
assume D is defined on all subsets of W and is a probability model. Suppose (W ,D) |= 1
2
Ψ. We
wish to show that the Turing machine M halts. Our strategy will be to show that minW and maxW
have positive measures, and every element between them has positive measure. Then checking the
sentences T0 encodingM becomes straightforward, as ∀ is interpreted classically on this linear chain.
Let NW0 be the subset of elements of NW of positive measure. By the axioms of equality of
T0, the restriction +
W
0 of +
W to NW0 is an equivalence relation and satisfies the indiscernability
of identicals. Therefore W ≡ W/+W0 as first order models, and for all ǫ, (W ,D) is ǫ-elementarily
equivalent to the probability model (W/+W0 ,D
′), where D′ is defined by assigning each equivalence
class [a] (as a point of W/+W0 ) the D-measure of [a] as a set. We are thus justified in assuming that
+ is true equality on NW0 henceforth.
By T 1
4
and T 3
4
we know that D(minW) = 14 , so min
W ∈ NW0 . By clause (1) of T 12 we know that
D(NW) = 12 .
Any ∀ quantifier relativized to N can be interpreted classically on NW0 . Thus, by clauses (2)
of T0, <
W defines a linear order on NW0 , and, by clauses (3) of T0, min
W is the unique minimal
element. However, it is not immediate whether maxW has positive measure and thus is the unique
maximal element of NW0 .
But by clause (8) of T0, we have (W ,D) |=0 ∀x∀y(R(x, y) → ¬N(y)). Then, for a fixed x of
positive measure, the set of y where RW(x, y) holds intersects NW with measure 0. Thus, by clauses
(2) of T 1
2
, if a ∈ NW0 is not maxW , then the equations
Pr
y∼D
[R(a, y)] + Pr
y∼D
[N(y) ∧ a < y] =
1
2
and
Pr
y∼D
[R(a, y)] + Pr
y∼D
[a + y] =
1
2
hold. For such an a,
Pr
y∼D
[N(y) ∧ a < y] = Pr
y∼D
[a + y] = D(a). (⋆)
Lemma 3.4.5. maxW ∈ NW0
Proof. Let 2W denote the immediate successor of minW in NW0 ; it exists since 1/4 = D(min
W) <
D(NW) = 1/2 and minW is minimal in the finite set NW0 . Suppose 2
W 6= maxW , and
τ := D(2W) and ξ := Pr
y∼D
[N(y) ∧ 2W < y].
Then we have
τ + ξ = Pr
y∼D
[N(y) ∧minW < y] = D(minW) =
1
4
, and
τ = ξ, by (⋆).
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Hence D(2W) = τ = ξ = 18 .
In general, if the (n− 1)-fold successor nW of minW has probability 2−n−1 for each n < m, then
the (m − 1)-fold successor mW of minW exists, and a) is either maxW , or b) satisfy the following
equations
Pr
y∈D
[N(y) ∧m− 1W < y] = Pr
y∈D
[N(y) ∧mW < y] +D(mW) and
D(mW) = Pr
y∈D
[N(y) ∧mW < y] by (⋆),
which, along with
1/2− 2−m + Pr
y∈D
[N(y) ∧m− 1W < y]
= D(min) +
m−1∑
n=2
D(nW) + Pr
y∈D
[N(y) ∧m− 1W < y]
= Pr
y∈D
[N(y)] = 1/2,
imply Pry∈D[N(y) ∧m− 1W < y] = 2−m and thus D(mW) = 2−m−1.
Now assume for the sake of contradiction that D(maxW) = 0. Then mW = maxW for no finite
m. This would mean that the m-fold successor of minW exists for all finite m. But NW0 is finite, so
this cannot be true. Therefore maxW must have positive measure, as desired. 
We have thus shown that NW0 is a linear chain ordered by <W , with minimal element min
W
and maximal element maxW . This structure allows us to interpret the sentences in T0 encoding the
Turing machine M classically.
Indeed, we can construct the computation history of M as follows:
At time t,
— the tape has a 1 at position p iff T (p, t) holds,
— the head of M is above cell p iff H(p, t) holds, and
— the state of M is q iff Sq(t) holds.
Now, aided by the verbal translation provided in the description of T0, we can verify that
◦ Initially, M is in state q0, the head is in the first position, and the tape has all 0s (clauses (4)
of T0).
◦ At any time, M is in one state and one state only (clause (5) of T0).
◦ The tape and M ’s head position and state are updated correctly according to δ (clauses (6)
of T0). In particular, all cells not specified by the update rule have the same symbol after the
update (clauses (6(b)iv)).
◦ At time maxW , M is in either an accepting or rejecting state (clause (7) of T0).
Hence, the 12E-satisfaction of Ψ implies M halts.
Finally, to complete our proof that finite ǫE-satisfiability is Σ01-complete, we prove
Theorem 3.4.6. For both X = E and X = F, finite ǫX-satisfiability is Σ01-definable for rational
ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and any first order language.
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Before the proof, we will need the following perturbation results, which allow us to “shake up”
the probability measures of each ǫ-model into a nicer form.
Lemma 3.4.7. Suppose (M, domD,D) is a measure space such that M is finite and D is defined
on all subsets of M . Then for any δ > 0, there exists a measure D′ defined on all subsets of M such
that
• all values of D′ are rational,
• D(S) = D′(S) whenever D(S) is rational and positive,
• maxS⊆M |D(S) −D′(S)| < δ, and
• D(S) > 0 for all S ⊆M
Proof. WLOG let M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Then D is uniquely determined by its values on i ∈ M . Let
p = 〈pi〉mi=1 represent this vector. Thus D(S) = vS ·p where vS is the vector whose value at position
i is 1 if i ∈ S and 0 otherwise.
Let 〈Sj〉kj=1 be an enumeration of all S ⊆ M such that D(S) is rational and positive. We can
then form the matrix R with row vectors vSj and the column vector q = 〈D(Sj)〉
k
j=1. Immediately,
we have
Rp = q.
Since all entries of R and q are rational, by Gaussian elimination, we can reduce the associated
matrix R|q to row echelon form R′|q′ with all rational entries. It’s then clear that we can perturb
each value of p by less than δ/|M | to get p′ such that 1) each entry of p′ is positive and rational,
and 2) R′p′ = q′ and thus Rp′ = q and all positive rational values of D are unaffected. Extending
the point measure p′ linearly to a measure over all subsets of M gives the desired result.
Lemma 3.4.8. Let ǫ ∈ (0, 1) be rational. If (M,D) is a finite ǫ-model, then for some measure D′
with domD′ = P(M) such that D′(x) is rational and positive for all x ∈M , (M,D′) is ǫ-elementarily
equivalent to (M,D).
Proof. By proposition (2.3.4) we may assume that D is defined on all subsets of M . Using lemma
(3.4.7) with
δ =
1
2
min

|1− ǫ|, min
S⊆M
D(S) 6∈Q
|D(S)− (1 − ǫ)|

 > 0,
there is a measure D′ defined on all subsets of M such that D′ has all rational and positive values,
D′ differs from D only on sets of irrational D-measure, and this difference is uniformly bounded by
δ. In particular, D(S) ≥ 1 − ǫ ⇐⇒ D′(S) ≥ 1 − ǫ, so (by an easy induction argument) (M,D) is
ǫ-elementary equivalent to (M,D′). Therefore (M,D′) |=ǫ φ.
For the following proof, we do not actually need D′(x) to be positive, but this lemma provides
an alternative justification for the assumption in the proof of (3.2.11).
Proof of thm (3.4.6). Let 〈ti〉i≥1 be an effective enumeration of all finite sequences of ω (for example
by Go¨del’s β function). For each finite sequence ti let |ti| denote the length of the sequence, let tij
denote the jth element of ti, for 1 ≤ j ≤ |ti|, and let ‖ti‖ denote the sum of its elements
∑|ti|
j=1 t
i
j .
Let σ be the vocabulary used in φ. To test whether a sentence φ is ǫE-satisfiable by a finite model,
we inspect ti in sequence for i = 1, 2, . . . . For each ti we form all classical models with signature σ on
|ti| elements {1, 2, . . . , |ti|}. There are only a finite number of them since σ is finite. We turn these
classical models into ǫ-models by imbuing them with the measure D defined by D(j) = tij/‖t
i‖. We
can then mechanically check whether any of them satisfy φ.
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If (M,D) |=ǫ φ for some finite ǫ-model (M,D), then WLOG we can assume M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}
for some m, D to be defined on all subsets ofM (by proposition (2.3.4)), and D to have all rational
values (by lemma (3.4.8)). Thus there exists an integer r such that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, D(i) = ri/r
and ri is an integer. Our algorithm described above will then terminate before k + 1 outer loops,
where tk = 〈ri〉
m
i=1.
This shows that the ǫE-satisfiability problem for rational ǫ is Σ01-definable. The ǫF-satisfiability
case is resolved identically.
Combined with theorem (3.4.4), this result shows
Corollary 3.4.9. Let L be a countable first order language with an infinite number of unary relations
and at least three binary relations. For any rational ǫ ∈ (0, 1), finite ǫE-satisfiability is Σ01-complete.
Equivalently, finite ǫF-validity is Π01-complete.
3.5 Finite and Countable ǫE-validity
Like the unrestricted case, the set of finitely (resp. countably) 0E-valid sentences also coincides with
the set of finitely (resp. countably) classically valid sentences. With Kuyper’s inter-reduction result
for ǫE-validities and the Σ01-definability derived from the last section, we can characterize ǫE-validity
over finite models precisely as Π01-complete whenever ǫ ∈ Q.
Theorem 3.5.1. For any countable first order language, the set of finitely 0E-valid sentences is
exactly the set of finitely classically valid sentences. The set of countably 0E-valid sentences is
exactly the set of classically valid sentences.
Proof. Obviously every finitely classically valid sentence is a finitely 0E-valid sentence.
Now suppose φ is finitely 0E-valid. Then for any n, (M,D) |=0 φ for all classical models M
of size n and D the uniform distribution. But in such 0-models, ∀ has the same interpretation as
classically. Hence all finite classical models satisfy φ, as desired.
The proof works the same for countable validities, except that for countably infinite models, we
instead ascribe the exponential distribution D(n) = 12n .
Immediately,
Corollary 3.5.2. Let L be any first order language and S be a set of sentences in L. The following
are equivalent:
• The set of finitely (resp. unrestricted) classically valid sentences in S is decidable.
• The set of finitely (resp. countably) 0E-valid sentences in S is decidable.
In any first order language with at least one binary relation, the set of finitely classically valid
sentences is Π01-complete [15, p. 166]. Therefore,
Corollary 3.5.3. In any first order language with at least one binary relation, the problem of
determining whether a sentence is finitely 0E-valid is Π01-complete.
Likewise, as classical validity in any language with at least one binary relation is Σ01-complete
[24], we have in the countable case
Corollary 3.5.4. In any first order language with at least one binary relation, the problem of
determining whether a sentence is countably 0E-valid is Σ01-complete.
There exist computable reductions for ǫE-validity just like in the case of ǫE-satisfiability (see
proposition (3.4.1)):
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Proposition 3.5.5 (Kuyper inter-reduction [12]). Let
• L be a countable first-order language not containing function symbols or equality, and
• L′ be the language obtained by adding an infinite number of unary predicates to L.
Then, for all rational 0 ≤ ǫ0 ≤ ǫ1 < 1, the set of normally ǫ0E-valid L-sentences many-one reduces
via a computable function to the set of normally ǫ1E-valid L-sentences.
More generally 5, this reduction works “per quantifier”: For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1) ∩ Q, there exists
a computable function Fǫ mapping qF-sentences in L to L′-sentences such that the following are
equivalent:
1. there exists a pair (M,D) such that
(M,D) |=q Φ.
2. Fǫ(Φ) is ǫF-satisfiable.
Again, the proof for this theorem and the construction of the reduction function given in [12]
carry over almost identically when we restrict our attention from “normally ǫE-valid” (validity over
all probability models) to “finitely ǫE-valid” (validity over all finite probability models — which is
equivalent to the validity over all finite models by (2.3.4)): the method of proof is the duplication
of a given model a finite number of times, and this procedure preserves finiteness of ǫ-models. This
observation remains true in considering countable ǫ-models.
Therefore, we have, by duality, the following two ǫF-analogues of (3.4.2) and (3.4.3).
Lemma 3.5.6. Let L and L′ be defined as above. For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1) ∩Q, there exists a computable
function Fǫ mapping qF-sentences in L to L′-sentences such that the following are equivalent:
1. there exists a pair (M,D) with M finite such that
(M,D) |=q Φ.
2. Fǫ(Φ) is finitely ǫF-satisfiable.
Lemma 3.5.7. Let L and L′ be defined as above and fix rational ǫ ∈ (0, 1). There is a computable
function fǫ such that, for any finite set of rationals J ⊆ Q ∩ [0, 1] and L-sentences {Ψα}α∈J , the
following are equivalent:
1. there exists a pair (M,D) such that, for each α ∈ J , (M,D) is a finite α-model and
(M,D) ⊢α Ψα.
2. fǫ({Ψα}α∈J) is finitely ǫF-satisfiable.
These two lemmas were used in the example section to express sentences over different error
parameters.
In (3.5.5), letting ǫ0 = 0, we obtain a computable reduction from finite 0E-validity to finite
ǫE-validity for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1). By corollary (3.5.3), we get
Corollary 3.5.8. For any language with an infinite number of unary predicates and at least one
binary predicate, finite ǫE-validity is Π01-hard for rational ǫ ∈ (0, 1).
5see [12, remark below thm 3.3].
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By theorem (3.4.6) for the case of X = F, finite ǫF-satisfiability is Σ01-definable for any language.
By duality, finite ǫE-validity is Π01-definable. Hence, in combination with the above corollary, this
implies
Theorem 3.5.9. For any language with an infinite number of unary predicates and at least one
binary predicate, finite ǫE-validity is Π01-complete for rational ǫ ∈ (0, 1).
Along the same lines, for the countable case, we have
Corollary 3.5.10. For any language with an infinite number of unary predicates and at least one
binary predicate, countable ǫE-validity is Σ01-hard for rational ǫ ∈ (0, 1).
Finally, we mention a theorem of Terwijn.
Proposition 3.5.11 (Terwijn [23]). Let φ be a sentence. φ is finitely classically valid iff φ is
countably ǫE-valid for every ǫ > 0.
4 Future Work
4.1 The Countable Case
As displayed by table (3), we still do not know much about ǫE-logic over countable ǫ-models. Most
egregiously we have no idea of the computability of its satisfiability problem. Looking over the entries
of tables (1), (2), and (3), the pattern seems to favor the possibility of countable ǫE-satisfiabilty
being Π01-hard or even complete. Obviously our proof for the finite case would not carry over, but
it is conceivable that replacing the halting set with a Π01-complete set would work out naturally.
Alternatively, we could look at the dual problem of reducing the halting set to countable ǫF-validity.
4.2 Reducing Language Requirement
In our results, the requirements of an infinite number of unary predicates and at least three binary
predicates are likely not optimal. In classical first order logic, these requirements can be collapsed
to the single requirement of one binary predicate through graph theoretic or set theoretic encodings.
However, in ǫE- and ǫF- logic, these methods do not seem to play well with the additional structure
of a probability space. In any case, for our theorems to be more relevant to applications, the
number of unary predicates must be brought down to a finite number, whether strengthening our
undecidability or breaking into decidability.
4.3 q-Logic and Trees
We developed q-sentences and other q-concepts only to arrive at results for ǫE- and ǫF-logic, but
they can as well be studied on their own. In particular, an obvious definition of q-logic would make
it a stronger version of Keisler’s probability logic which only allows the quantifiers Q≥ǫ and Q>ǫ .
Keisler’s work [7] can then be applied in most aspects to such a q-logic.
Similarly, one could investigate the algebraic structure of ǫE-, ǫF-, and q-trees, whose properties
we have not fully exploited. It should not be hard to see that, for a fixed ǫ-model (M,D) and a fixed
(q-)sentence Φ, there is a natural partial order and a join operation on trees (M,D) for Φ of each
class. Instinctively one could ask, under what circumstance does a meet operation exists? Deeper
research into the semilattice structure of these trees could reveal information on the computability
of ǫE and ǫF fragments not discussed here.
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4.4 Irrational ǫ
There are several insufficiencies in current techniques with regard to deducing facts about irrational
ǫs:
(i) Terwijn and Kuyper’s proofs of the inter-reduction theorems fundamentally require the ratio
ǫ0/ǫ1 to be rational. So while this would imply we have inter-reductions between, say
1√
2
and
1
2
√
2
, we cannot say much about the relative difficulties of 12 and
1√
2
. Surpassing the obstacles
to generalize to irrational ǫ would necessitate brand new methods, which could also eliminate
the infinite unary predicate restriction.
(ii) Our proof of the Σ01-hardness of finite ǫE-satisfiability depends crucially on the ability of
1
2E-
logic to force the measures of two sets to be equal. Without a reduction from 12E- to ǫE-validity,
we cannot conclude that ǫE-validity is Σ01-hard.
(iii) In order for a linear program to be solved in finite time, all arithmetic operations over the field
generated by its coefficients must be total computable. This holds for the rational and general
number fields, but not for the field of computable reals, for which the comparison function is
not total. Thus our proof of decidabilities in monadic relational languages do not carry over
to the general case.
Fortunately, as our example section illustrate, in many cases only the relative magnitude of ǫ
matters. This observation also boosts the likelihood that our computability results hold for general
ǫ as well.
4.5 Classical Model Theory Techniques
Given the applications in section (2.4) and the initial motivation of ǫE-logic, we see that it has an
intimate connection with computational learning theory. At the intersection of CLT and classical
model theory is the concept of VC dimension [6][14][1][2], which we mentioned briefly. It could be
possible to reconcile the results of these two disciplines in ǫE- and ǫF-logics, to the benefit of all
involved.
As our examples also hinted, many techniques in finite model theory could be converted to
versions for our probability logics. One could also experiment with adding new means of expressions
like the BIT relation, a canonical ordering, counting operators, etc. An analogue of descriptive
complexity could be developed; given the abundance of probabilistic quantifiers in classes like BPP,
PP, PCP, and so on, it is indeed plausible that one could equate one of these complexity classes with
a description class in ǫE-logic.
A version of Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ games [15], another common tool in finite model theory, for
ǫE-logic could also have connections to the malicious advisary learning model [8][20].
4.6 Computational Complexity
In addition to developing descriptive complexity, one could also explore typical6 -case complexity in
ǫE-logic.
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